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In 1789 when James Madison proposed a number of changes to the 
Constitution—what became the Bill of Rights—he made it clear that in 
selecting the proposals “nothing of a controvertible nature ought to be 
hazarded.”1  The last thing he wanted was a protracted debate about 
amendments that was as likely to founder as it was to succeed.2  Indeed, the 
Congressional Record confirms that the proposed provisions were not as 
                                                      
*Mr. Ostler obtained his J.D. from B.Y.U., and practiced law in Utah for eleven years.  He 
recently obtained a Ph.D. in legal history from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, and is 
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1. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 1787–90 at 406 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900). 
2. Madison noted as much during the House debates.  On August 15, 1789, he said that he 
had proposed amendments that gave “some security . . .  for those great and essential rights which 
[many] had been taught to believe were in danger . . . But while I approve of these amendments, I 
should oppose the consideration at this time of such as are likely to change the principles of the 
Government, or that are of a doubtful nature; because I apprehend there is little prospect of 
obtaining the consent of two-thirds of both houses of Congress, and three-fourths of the state 
legislatures, to ratify propositions of this kind.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 775 (1789) (Joseph Gales 
ed., 1834). 
2013] Rights Under the Ninth Amendment 37 
heavily debated as some had feared.3  The Ninth Amendment also was the 
focus of very little comment or debate.4 
This is quite a contrast to the current debate about the Ninth 
Amendment, and how to identify the rights it was intended to protect.  
Scholars and judges in recent times have frequently disagreed over the 
proper method to identify Ninth Amendment rights.5  Other scholars assert 
that the Ninth Amendment was intended as a mere restatement of states’ 
rights, or as a limit on federal powers rather than as recognition of inherent 
rights.6  As one scholar noted, many believe the Ninth Amendment 
“appears incapable of practical interpretation.  No one has yet discovered a 
mechanism for empowering courts to identify the ‘other [rights] retained by 
                                                      
3. When Madison proposed the subject of amendments on June 8, 1789, Representative 
Smith said that “[i]f we go into the discussion of this subject, it will take us three weeks or a 
month; and during all this time, every other business must be suspended.”  Representative Jackson 
predicted that, “it will take a year to complete it!”  Representative Vining said, “May it not be 
procrastinated into days, weeks, nay, months?”  1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 441–42, 
446.  However, their fears were unfounded.  The house debates on amendments occurred over ten 
consecutive meeting days in August, from August 13 through 24.  Id. at 703–85.  However, the 
majority of the debate focused on more controversial amendments and proposals which were not 
ultimately adopted.  Debate on the actual amendments which we know as the Bill of Rights 
occurred only between August 16 and 22, and consumed a mere fifteen pages of the record.  Most 
of the amendments were adopted without significant discussion.  Id. at 757–61; 778–85; 788–90; 
795–97. 
4. The need for the Ninth Amendment was described by Madison in his speech presenting 
amendments on June 8, 1789.  Id. at 451.  On the same day, Representative Jackson concurred that 
something like a Ninth Amendment was needed if any rights were enumerated.  Id. at 442.  He 
said, “There is a maxim in law, and it will apply to bills of rights, that when you enumerate 
exceptions, the exceptions operate to the exclusion of all circumstances that are omitted; 
consequently, unless you except every right from the grant of power, those omitted are inferred to 
be resigned to the discretion of the Government.”  The Ninth Amendment was only briefly 
debated on August 17, 1789.  Id. at 749–56. 
5. See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION’S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 14 (1995) (“Given that Ninth Amendment rights are, 
by definition, not spelled out in the Constitution, how do we divine their substance?  This may be 
the toughest issue of all, for it forces us to articulate and defend a principled methodology of 
constitutional interpretation.”); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth 
Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 160 (1988) (“The fact that the [N]inth [A]mendment is 
no longer forgotten clearly does not establish that many of us know confidently what to do with 
it.”); Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States S., 100th Congress 130, 249 
(1987) (“Nobody has ever to my knowledge understood precisely what the Ninth Amendment did 
mean and what it was intended to do . . .  I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless 
you know something of what it means.  For example, if you had an amendment that says 
‘Congress shall make  no’ and then there is an inkblot and you cannot read the rest of it and that is 
the only copy you  have, I do not think the court can make up what might be under the inkblot if 
you cannot read it.”) 
6. McAffee is one proponent of the rights/powers view.  See Thomas B. McAffee, The 
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990).  Kurt Lash is the 
main proponent of the state’s rights view.  See Kurt T. Lash, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT (2009). 
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the people . . .’”7  Because of the difficulty judges and scholars have 
seemed to experience in understanding the Ninth Amendment, it has largely 
been ignored by the courts.  Only in recent years has the amendment been 
referenced by Supreme Court Justices, and even then, usually only as 
support after an independent basis for the decision at hand has been found.8 
Yet if Ninth Amendment rights are so difficult to identify, why wasn’t 
that very point raised against it in the congressional and state debates over 
ratification?  More to the point, was it intended by the Founders that the 
Ninth Amendment would not be used, out of fear of its open-ended nature, 
or concern over the method or theory to be used in identifying rights?  Were 
the Founders as uncertain of its meaning as succeeding generations have 
been? 
This Article seeks to answer these questions.  Specifically, it asserts 
that the Founders did not consider finding rights under the Ninth 
Amendment difficult at all.  For us today to know what unenumerated rights 
were intended by the Ninth Amendment, we need only consult the natural 
law rights understanding of the founding generation.9 
Part One will discuss the few comments by the Founders that have 
been misconstrued to suggest that it would be difficult to identify Ninth 
Amendment rights.  However, it will be seen that even these references in 
fact do not support any supposed difficulty in finding rights.  This part will 
also refute the rights/powers and states’ rights view of the Ninth 
Amendment asserted by some scholars.  Finally, this part will discuss the 
original intent of the Founders and their belief that such original intent 
should be followed by succeeding generations, particularly regarding the 
identification of Ninth Amendment rights. 
Part Two will discuss the rights understanding of the Founders and 
their views of natural law.  Most importantly, this section will demonstrate 
with thirteen concrete examples that the Ninth Amendment and the natural 
law views of the Founders would have been a much better tool than the 
                                                      
7. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. 
L. J. 759, 761 (1994).  Sanders asserts that Ninth Amendment rights are identified by seeing if any 
claimed right causes tangible physical or economic harm to others. 
8. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (mentioning the Ninth, but relying 
on the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555 (1980) (mentioning the Ninth, but relying on the First Amendment); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (referring to the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments 
before the Ninth). 
9. Some other scholars have made a similar argument to that proposed in this Article.  See, 
e.g., J.D. Droddy, Originalist Justification and the Methodology of Unenumerated Rights 1999 L. 
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET.  C.L. 809 (1999); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987). 
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Fourteenth Amendment for the Supreme Court to use through the years to 
find “fundamental” rights.  Hence, this part will demonstrate how a proper 
use of the natural law views of the Founders under the Ninth Amendment 
will eliminate most accusations of judicial activism today, and will put the 
substantive due process rights allegedly derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment in their proper place. 
PART ONE: THE FOUNDERS SAW NO DIFFICULTY IN 
IDENTIFYING NINTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
As noted above, there is considerable disagreement among scholars 
about the purpose and meaning of the Ninth Amendment, and the best way 
to find the rights it was intended to protect.10  Bennett B. Patterson, one of 
the first modern scholars to research the Ninth Amendment, has even 
maintained that “the unenumerated rights [in the Ninth Amendment] permit 
of no exact definition.  To attempt to define these rights would be contrary 
to the obvious intent and meaning of the amendment.”11 
The Founders would have been surprised to hear such notions.  
Indeed, if Ninth Amendment rights were supposedly so hard to identify, 
why wasn’t that very point raised against it by the Founders?  After all, the 
members of Congress who debated the Ninth Amendment, and 
contemporary Founders who had the opportunity to comment on it, were 
extremely astute men, and certainly must have understood this problem if it 
indeed was considered to be a problem.  Yet this alleged rights 
identification problem with the Ninth Amendment was actually not raised at 
all by any member of Congress! 
Comments in Congress on the Bill of Rights 
Indeed, the opposite notion is raised in a debate that took place in the 
House of Representatives on August 15, 1789 regarding the right to 
assemble.  Representative Theodore Sedgwick asserted that listing the right 
to assemble in the First Amendment was inadvisable because it was “a self-
evident, unalienable” part of free speech that did not need to be listed 
separately.12  He went on to say that such “trifles” should not be included in 
a bill of rights.  If they were, the result would be “a very lengthy 
enumeration of rights” such as, for example, a man’s “right to wear his hat 
if he pleased; [and] that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed 
                                                      
10. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., Bennett B. Patterson, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 44 (1955). 
12. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 759. 
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when he thought proper.”13 
Representatives Tucker and Gerry both offered a response to 
Sedgwick’s concern.  Tucker stated that he “hoped the words would not be 
struck out, for he considered them of importance,” while Gerry “was also 
against the words being struck out, because he conceived it to be an 
essential right.”14  Obviously, what was being discussed was not any 
perceived difficulty in identifying rights, but what rights were fundamental 
and important enough to be enumerated as part of the proposed First 
Amendment.  But as Representative Page then pointed out, even seemingly 
trivial matters such as wearing a hat “have been opposed, and a man has 
been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of 
authority; people have also been prevented from assembling” and “therefore 
it is well to guard against such stretches of authority.”15 
In sum, the whole point of the debate was not about any difficulty in 
identification of rights, since none of those who spoke that day had any 
difficulty identifying rights.  Rather, the debate was about which rights 
were so fundamental that they should be specifically listed in the First 
Amendment, rather than left to be covered by the Ninth.  The very purpose 
for creation of the Ninth Amendment was to protect those rights that—as 
pointed out by Representative Page—might someday still be abridged by 
government, although they were not specifically enumerated.  There was no 
other point in the congressional debate where ease or difficulty in 
identifying rights was raised. 
The Virginia Ratifying Convention and the Rights/Powers Issue 
In the state ratifying conventions, once again the alleged difficulty of 
identifying Ninth Amendment rights was not a major issue.  Indeed, this 
point was only raised once, and even then not as a primary objection, but as 
a secondary matter. 
The occasion was the ratification debates in the Virginia legislature.  
Edmund Randolph apparently objected to the word “retained” in the 
proposed Ninth Amendment, although his comments come to us 
                                                      
13. Id. at 760.  Randy Barnett sites this exchange to support the idea that any attempt at 
enumerating Ninth Amendment rights would be “dangerously incomplete.”  Randy Barnett, The 
Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 30–33 (2006).  Because of this 
incompleteness, it is sometimes assumed that identifying all such rights is impossible.  Regardless 
of whether this is so, identifying specific rights in concrete cases based on the natural rights view 
of the founders is not at all difficult, as this Article explains. 
14. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 760. 
15. Id. 
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secondhand.16  Randolph was said to have noted that “the rights declared in 
the first ten of the proposed amendments were not all that a free people 
would require the exercise of,” and further that “there was no criterion by 
which it could be determined whither [sic] any other particular right was 
retained or not.”17  But then Randolph betrayed his true concern, a concern 
that had nothing to do with any difficulty in identifying unenumerated 
rights, but that dealt instead with the powers of Congress.  He expressed his 
opinion that it would be better to prevent an extension of “the powers of 
Congress by their own authority, [rather] than as a protection to rights 
reducable [sic] to no definitive certainty.”18  After all, such a restriction on 
congressional power was the original proposal by the Virginia 
Constitutional Ratifying Convention, as expressed in that state’s proposed 
amendments.19 
The reality that Randolph’s real objection was to clarify limits to 
Congress’ powers is expressed in the responses to Randolph by both state 
Representative Hardin Burnley and by James Madison.  Neither bothered to 
discuss the alleged difficulty in identifying rights that Randolph seemed to 
have raised, but both spoke of the powers/rights issue.  Burnley stated that 
“I see not the force of this distinction, for by preventing an extension of 
power in that body [Congress] from which danger is apprehended safety 
will be insured if its powers are not too extensive already, [and] so by 
protecting the rights of the people [and] of the States, an improper extension 
                                                      
16. The account was given by representative Hardin Burnley in a letter to James Madison, 
who said that Randolph’s argument “if I understood it” was as given above.  Letter from Hardin 
Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 




19. Randolph encouraged a return to Virginia’s seventeenth proposed amendment, which 
read as follows: “That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers 
be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress.  But that they may 
be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or 
otherwise as inserted merely for greater caution.”  George Mason, Amendment Recommended “to 
the Consideration” of First Congress (1788), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1119 (Robert 
A. Rutland, ed., 1970) (emphasis added).  In his proposed amendments, Madison had altered this 
wording to refer to both rights and powers: “The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, 
made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of 
other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but 
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.”  1 ANNALS 
OF CONG., supra note 2, at 452 (emphasis added).  As reflected in the final wording of the Ninth 
Amendment, Congress greatly altered this wording even further, deleting all reference to powers, 
and expressing the concept solely in terms of rights: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added). 
42 FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7 
 
of power will be prevented.”20  Madison stated that Randolph’s concern was  
 
altogether fanciful.  If a line can be drawn between the 
powers granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be 
the same thing, whether the latter be secured by declaring 
that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall not 
be extended.  If no line can be drawn, a declaration in either 
form would amount to nothing.21 
 
Indeed, Randolph himself in a letter to George Washington indicated 
that his real concern with the Amendment was that “[C]ongress have 
endeavored to administer an opiate, by an alteration, which is merely 
plausible.”22  The opiate was switching from a discussion of powers to 
rights.  If he was really concerned about the difficulty of identifying 
unenumerated rights, he would certainly have said so in this letter.  Hence, 
Randolph did not raise the question of what supposedly open-ended rights 
the Ninth Amendment was meant to cover (which has been so troubling to 
scholars in modern times) because he was concerned about the matter.  He 
was concerned solely with limiting federal power. 
In reviewing this objection by Randolph, and the responses to it by 
Burnley and Madison, one scholar asserts that the Ninth Amendment was 
primarily seen as a tool to limit the scope of federal power, and not as an 
open ended invitation to find modern rights.23 
While this argument is basically on the right track and is especially 
commendable in condemning efforts by many scholars to use the Ninth 
Amendment to justify modern rights, it goes too far in assuming that rights 
were secondary to powers in the minds of the Framers forming the Ninth 
Amendment.  Indeed, such an interpretation inverts the issue that the 
Founders found most important (natural rights) in favor of the view that 
powers (or their limitation) are the standard to be relied on in determining 
and identifying rights.  As this Article demonstrates, constitutional grants of 
power were clearly seen by the Founders as secondary to natural rights 
retained by the people—rights that were understood by the Founders as 
being pre-political and above even the Constitution itself, with all of its 
powers.  Since congressional power is subordinate to such rights, it is 
precisely the existence of these unenumerated rights that stands as the 
                                                      
20. 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY.supra note 16, at 219. 
21. Id. at 222. 
22. Id. at 223. 
23. See, e.g., McAffee, supra note 6, at 1290. 
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ultimate check on federal power.  Accordingly, the need to identify these 
rights is just as great as ever.  Simply put, there are certain realms in which 
the Federal Congress has no power to legislate: the realm of unenumerated 
rights.  Indeed, if the Ninth Amendment was understood as being solely 
about limiting powers, there would have been no perceived need for a new 
constitutional amendment, proposed by Virginia in 1793 (but not adopted), 
to “restrict the general welfare clause to Congress’s enumerated powers.”24 
What was Debated and What was Not 
In respect to the Constitution, when one reads the notes pertaining to 
the original Constitutional Convention in 1787, and the state ratifying 
convention debates in 1787 and 1788, and then contrasts the views of the 
anti-federalists who hated the Constitution with the arguments in its favor 
by its defendants, the most striking feature of the debate is the focus on 
structure and federalism rather than on rights.25  To be sure, detractors of 
the new Constitution cited lack of a bill of rights as a fatal flaw in the 
Constitution, along with a host of structural problems they also felt should 
be changed.26  But it was the existence of a bill of rights, not the content or 
substance of such a bill of rights, that they were upset about.  Perhaps the 
best example of this is found in the comments of George Mason at the end 
of the Constitutional Convention.  One of the reasons he refused to sign the 
Constitution was its lack of a bill of rights.  However, he did not think this 
lack would lead to extensive debates over rights, since he felt a bill of rights 
was so uncontroversial it could be drafted and inserted by the convention in 
just a few hours.27 
Meanwhile, the most heated debates continued to rage over structural 
issues: the extent of Congress’ powers; the nature of the executive power; 
the reach (or lack of reach) of judicial review; and most of all, the degree to 
which the states could be said to be “swallowed up” by the new federal 
                                                      
24. 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 470 (1983). 
25. This can be seen by contrasting “The Federalist” penned by Hamilton, Madison, and 
Jay with one of the chief anti-Federalist publications, “Letters from the Federal Farmer” penned 
by Richard Henry Lee.  Almost all of the disputed issues relate to structural matters.  Yet Lee and 
Madison agreed on the need for the Ninth Amendment, as seen by this statement from Lee that 
closely parallels Madison’s thoughts regarding the need for the Ninth Amendment: “[A]s 
individual rights are numerous, and not easy to be enumerated in a bill of rights, and from articles, 
or stipulations, securing some of them, it may be inferred, that others not mentioned are 
surrendered.” Richard Henry Lee, LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER 105 (1978). 
26. Lee, supra note 25, at 105–12; 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 19, at 
991. 
27. Journal of the Constitutional Convention, 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 
supra note 1, at 442. 
44 FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7 
 
goliath.28  Notably lacking in this intensity of emotion and argument is any 
meaningful debate over the content and substance of individual rights to be 
protected. 
Indeed, for most of the Founders, individual rights were not 
debatable—they were fundamental.  Individual rights were derived from the 
law of nature, which predated the social compact, and inhered in the very 
being of each man and woman.  In light of this, it is not surprising that 
George Mason thought the Constitutional Convention could write up an 
acceptable bill of rights within a matter of hours, or that Congress devoted 
little time to debating the Bill of Rights when it was presented to them.  As 
another scholar noted, “[C]olonials believed that ‘the laws of nature are 
those which are expressive of the will of God, the true nature of man, the 
constitution of the universe.  And they doubted not their ability to discover 
those laws.’”29 
Only one state among those that ratified the Bill of Rights seemed to 
struggle with it, and everyone knew why.  It was the State of Virginia, 
whose senate was, in the words of Jefferson, “7/8 antifederalists.”30  
Disappointed at Madison’s genius in proposing amendments based on 
natural law that dealt only with undisputed individual rights, they tried to 
shoot down the whole amendment effort in the hope of creating the need for 
a new constitutional convention that would focus on the structural and 
state/federal issues that they were really concerned about. 
Closely related to the rights/powers issue in respect to the Ninth 
Amendment is the extent to which it was intended to act jointly with the 
Tenth Amendment to protect states’ rights.  In his book, Kurt Lash has 
amassed an impressive array of historical support for this proposition.31  
However, Madison’s presentation of proposed amendments to Congress 
indicates his understanding that the two amendments were very different.  
The two amendments were stated separately in different parts of the speech, 
with an indication that each amendment was to be inserted directly into a 
different clause of the Constitution.32  Furthermore, in his presentation to 
                                                      
28. These and other structural issues are dealt with admirably in the writings of Richard 
Henry Lee and George Mason.  See supra note 25, and accompanying text. 
29. Eugene M. Van Loan III, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 162 
(Randy Barnett ed. 1989). 
30. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Dec. 14, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 224, supra note 16. 
31. Lash, supra note 6. 
32. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2 at 456.  Madison’s proposal of inserting the 
amendments directly into the Constitution was later replaced with the suggestion of Roger 
Sherman—agreed to by vote of the House on August 19, 1789—that the amendments be added to 
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Congress, Madison listed a number of reasons that had been asserted 
against adopting a bill of rights, answering each one in turn.  The only one 
of the reasons that Madison expressed concern about was the problem 
remedied by the Ninth Amendment—how to overcome the presumption 
that creating a list of rights impliedly granted Congress the power to 
legislate on everything not in the list.  Nor was Madison the only one to 
have this concern.  Representative Jackson expressed it quite well in a 
comment he offered immediately after Madison had presented the proposed 
Bill of Rights on June 8th: 
 
There is a maxim in law, and it will apply to bills of rights, 
that when you enumerate exceptions, the exceptions 
operate to the exclusion of all circumstances that are 
omitted; consequently, unless you except every right from 
the grant of power, those omitted are inferred to be 
resigned to the discretion of the Government.33 
 
Regarding this concern, Madison stated that, “[T]his is one of the most 
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill 
of rights.”34  Contrast this with Madison’s apology, later in his speech, for 
proposing the Tenth Amendment—an apology that seemed to border on 
near embarrassment.  He stated: 
 
I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the 
State conventions, that several are particularly anxious that 
it should be declared in the constitution, that the powers not 
therein delegated should be reserved to the several States.  
Perhaps words which may define this more precisely than 
the whole of the instrument now does, may be considered 
as superfluous.  I admit they may be deemed unnecessary: 
but there can be no harm in making such a declaration.35 
 
In sum, Madison’s very presentation and statements, along with 
statements by other Founders, indicate a clear understanding of the different 
functions of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  The Ninth Amendment was 
a crucial statement, necessary to preserve natural rights from legislative 
encroachment.  The Tenth Amendment was a mere acknowledgment that 
                                                      
the Constitution “by way of supplement.”  Id. at 795. 
33. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 460. 
34. Id. at 456. 
35. Id. at 458–59. 
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the new nation had created a unique system of federalism, in which 
different governments had different responsibilities.  These are very distinct 
concepts. 
Original Intent 
An essential assumption in this Article is that the original intent of the 
Founders regarding natural rights should continue to be followed today.  
Interestingly, one of the arguments used by some who oppose interpreting 
the Constitution based on original intent is the Ninth Amendment. They 
argue that the extra-textual reference to unenumerated rights in the Ninth 
Amendment makes interpreting the Constitution according to the textual 
original intent impossible as well, since the Ninth Amendment renders the 
text incomplete.36 
The proponents of this argument are correct in asserting that there is 
no logical consistency in applying original intent to all of the Constitution 
except the Ninth Amendment.  But it is wrong to assume that Ninth 
Amendment unenumerated rights are impossible or even difficult to 
identify, and therefore the Ninth Amendment undermines the concept of 
original intent.  The Founders did not consider identifying such rights to be 
difficult.  Indeed, rather than being the supposed best evidence against 
original intent, the Ninth Amendment is in fact the best evidence in its 
favor. 
This conclusion is unavoidable when the Ninth Amendment is 
considered according to standard principles of interpretation.  As any 
contract attorney will attest, because the wording of the Ninth Amendment 
is both open-ended and referential, it is essentially an incorporation by 
reference clause.  This open-ended reference was intentional, but was not 
meant to refer to a void or a black hole that was endless or undiscoverable.  
It had to refer to something.  Yet, it would be error to just blandly assume 
(as most Ninth Amendment scholars have strangely done) that the rights it 
referred to could consist of whatever future generations wanted to include.  
As brilliant as they were, would the Founders have intentionally left open a 
door for future generations to justify any right they felt inclined to name, 
based on the whims of the times?  Would they have inserted a clause 
                                                      
36. See Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Ninth Amendment: An Essay on 
Unenumerated Rights and the Impossibility of Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2129 (2010); 
Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC 
QUESTIONS 69 (2007); Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: 
Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 169, 193–94 (2003). 
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whereby “rights” could be found that might harm the people?  Simply put, 
would the Founders have logically placed an opening in the Constitution 
that could serve to undermine its very purpose? 
Hardly.  Again, as any contract attorney knows, an incorporation by 
reference clause must include something already in existence.  It cannot 
include future provisions, for this would be nothing more than an 
unenforceable agreement to agree, that would undermine the entirety of the 
contract.  Thus, the Ninth Amendment was intended to be an anchor to 
secure the ship of state to solid, foundational principles commonly accepted 
in the founding age.  The Founders would have been appalled at any 
attempt to use the Ninth Amendment to justify removing both anchor and 
rudder, leaving the ship of state to drift aimlessly wherever the popular 
currents and ever-changing fads might take it.  Indeed, that would be the 
opposite of their intention in creating the Ninth Amendment. 
 The Founders very firmly intended that the Ninth Amendment would 
include fundamental, morally-based rights from their generation that should 
continue to be followed by succeeding generations.  In short, they 
contemplated that their original intent regarding rights would be adhered to 
by succeeding generations.  As James Madison said, “The [governmental] 
improvements made by the dead form a debt against the living, who take 
the benefit of them.  This debt cannot be otherwise discharged than by a 
proportionate obedience to the will of the Authors of the improvements.”37  
Madison made it clear that the “improvements” he was talking about were 
the governmental structure and rights set in place by the founding 
generation.  He further noted that: 
 
There seems, then, to be some foundation in the nature of 
things; in the relation one generation bears to another, for 
the descent of obligations from one to another.  Equity may 
require it.  Mutual good may be promoted by it.  And all 
that seems indispensible in stating the account between the 
dead and the living, is to see that the debts against the latter 
do not exceed the advances made by the former.38 
                                                      
37. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 5 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 439. 
38. Id.  This quote clearly indicates Madison’s belief that the values and rights of the 
founding generation—which were for the most part not debated in the Constitutional Convention 
anyway (since mostly structure was debated there)—should continue to be followed by 
succeeding generations.  Yet this seems to be diametrically opposed to the oft-cited statements by 
Madison regarding his reluctance to reveal his notes regarding the Federal Convention, and that 
such notes should not be followed in constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, 
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARVARD L. REV. 885, 935–942 (1985).  
However, there is no inconsistency.  Rather than the Constitutional Convention, Madison 
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In short, while the obligation of the living was not to exceed what the 
Founders put in place, it was nonetheless firmly rooted in what they 
created.  This includes the Ninth Amendment and the natural law rights it 
included as understood by the founding generation. 
This quote has frequently been overlooked by proponents of original 
intent possibly because it was a response by Madison to the suggestion of 
Jefferson—another Founder—that “no society can make a perpetual 
constitution, or even a perpetual law . . . every constitution . . . and every 
law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years.”39  Jefferson grounded this 
assertion on a rather complicated analysis—based on then existing mortality 
rates—that nineteen years was the point of turnover (i.e., death) of more 
than half of any country’s population, and the dead should not control the 
living.  While these statements by Jefferson seem to suggest he did not 
favor an original intent analysis, in fact the opposite is true.  Jefferson based 
this entire nineteen year argument on the idea that the laws of nature 
controlled each succeeding generation—that each generation “have the 
same rights over the soil on which they were produced, as the preceding 
generations had.  They derive these rights not from their predecessors, but 
from nature.”40  The Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson penned, 
embodies the morally-based “laws of nature and of nature’s God”41 that he 
believed must bind each generation.  Hence, Jefferson favored the idea that 
the unchangeable laws of nature—such as those embodied in the Ninth 
Amendment—controlled each generation, even if the constitution each 
generation formed had expired.  Accordingly, Jefferson reaffirmed the 
Founders’ belief that even constitutions are inferior to the laws of nature, 
and while men may not owe allegiance to the constitution that a prior 
generation of men had created, they still owed allegiance to the same laws 
of nature. 
Madison did not disagree with that concept, but in his response noted 
                                                      
encouraged use of ratifying conventions to discover original intent, and was only reluctant to use 
the Convention notes because he did not think it adequately represented the intent of the people as 
a whole.  9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 421 (stating that rather than rely 
on the Convention notes to interpret constitutional provisions, “let us look for that in which they 
must have been understood by the conventions, or rather by the people, who thro’ [sic] their 
conventions, accepted and ratified it.”)  As this Article demonstrates, there was hardly any dispute 
on natural law rights among members of the people of the founding generation, and therefore their 
original intent in respect to such rights is easy to ascertain. 
39. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1892–99). 
40. Id. at 119. 
41. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
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that Jefferson’s conclusions would turn property conveyancing on its head, 
and also wreak havoc with ongoing constitutional interpretation.42  Hence, 
for Madison, not only the laws of nature, but also the original intent of the 
constitutional laws of men would bind future generations.  Jefferson 
apparently came to accept this view himself.  In 1823, he stated in respect 
to constitutional interpretation:  
 
On every question of construction, [let us] carry ourselves 
back to the time when the Constitution was adopted, 
recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of 
trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or 
invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it 
was passed.43 
 
Madison and Jefferson were not alone in their understanding that 
future generations were to be bound by the original intent of the Founders 
based on natural rights.  This concept permeated the thinking of their entire 
generation.  This idea is expressed in Article 15 of the 1776 Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, which stated that “no free government, or the 
blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence 
to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles.”44  Similar provisions are found in 
the Revolutionary Era Declaration of Rights in Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, Vermont, North Carolina, and New Hampshire.45  Indeed, as 
this Article makes clear, the Founders viewed natural law rights as 
fundamental, pre-dating the Constitution.  As John Adams stated, we have 
“rights antecedent to all earthly government—rights, that cannot be 
repealed or restrained by human laws;—rights, derived from the Great 
Legislator of the Universe.”46  The Founders clearly contemplated that these 
basic principles would continue to be followed by succeeding generations. 
However, such an idea is not popular among scholars or jurists today.  
                                                      
42. Speeches in the First Congress, 2d Session (Feb. 1790), in 5  THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 1, at 437–41. 
43. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 231. 
44. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE 
UNITED STATES 3814 (Francis Thorpe ed., 1993) (1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS] (emphasis added). 
45. See Pennsylvania, 5 id. at 3083; Massachusetts, 3 id. at 1892; Vermont, 6 id. at 3741; 
North Carolina, 5 id. at 2788; New Hampshire, 4 id. at 2457. 
46. John Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 449 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851). 
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They generally prefer a more open-ended way to identify rights, freed from 
the moral and religious sentiment of the Founding Era.  For example, one 
scholar has asserted that “it would be wrong to attempt to reconstruct what 
natural law meant in the eighteenth century and pretend that that version of 
natural law is enshrined in the [N]inth [A]mendment.”47  His reason?  
Rather amazingly it is that “while natural law is immutable [i.e., 
unchangeable], people’s understanding of it can improve.”48  Just how does 
one “improve” the unchangeable?  Such a statement assumes that the 
Founders were dense when it came to natural rights, but we somehow 
understand them better.  Anyone who has studied the writings of the 
founding generation about natural rights, and compared them to the natural 
rights writings of people today (to the extent any attention is even paid to 
natural rights today) will perceive that it is the other way around. 
Another scholar recognized this reality, then turned around and denied 
it.  He stated that “the documentary sources of the Bill of Rights reveal that 
conceptions of natural rights were much more determinate two hundred 
years ago than both commentators and courts suppose today.”49  Yet he then 
asserts that each succeeding generation has the power to “add to or subtract 
from the list of its predecessors.”50  This is a clear defiance of an 
incorporation by reference clause, and tends to undermine the entirety of the 
compact.  Simply put, an adherence to the natural rights understandings of 
the founding generation is discounted by most scholars today because it 
disallows the free-wheeling creation of modern “rights” that has become so 
popular.  The Founders never would have agreed with such a practice. 
                                                      
47. Morris S. Arnold, Doing More Than Remembering the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI. 
KENT L. REV. 265, 267 (1988). 
48. Id. 
49. Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1078 (1991). 
50. Id. at 1082.  Rosen purports to derive this conclusion from a statement of James 
Wilson, in which he said that “the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be 
progressive in its operations and effects.”  James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF 
THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 143 (Wilson, ed., 1804).  However, the omitted portions of the 
quote clarify Wilson’s meaning.  He stated: “Our progress in virtue should certainly bear a just 
proportion to our progress in knowledge.  Morals are undoubtedly capable of being carried to a 
much higher degree of excellence than the sciences, excellent as they are.  Hence, we may infer, 
that the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its operations and 
effects.  Indeed, the same immutable principles will direct this progression.”  Id.  Hence, we see 
that Wilson had no intention that this simple statement be turned into an open-ended finding of 
“rights” wherever people want to find them—especially rights that would be contrary to virtue 
such as the modern “right of privacy.” Wilson was simply noting that natural law, derived from 
God, is unchangeable, but that as time passes and new circumstances arise, the old, natural laws 
will be progressively applied to the new circumstances.  As Wilson noted, the principles of natural 
law, being immutable, can never change, no matter what new circumstances come along. 
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The Ninth Amendment is steeped in natural rights and social compact 
theory.  Interestingly, most scholars who discuss the Ninth Amendment 
agree that it was meant to secure natural rights as understood by the 
founding generation.51  The Founders turned to natural law in the 1770s 
precisely because it was the only legitimate way they could justify overt 
lawless rebellion against the sovereign.  In short, natural law was the 
justification for the Revolution, and subsequent establishment of the 
American nation.  As stated by Madison as one of his proposed 
amendments, “[T]he people have an indubitable, unalienable, and 
indefeasible right to reform or change their Government, whenever it be 
found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.”52 Jefferson 
stated the same concept in his opening paragraph of the Declaration of 
Independence, in which he noted that it was “pursuant to the laws of nature 
and nature’s God” that allowed the colonists “to dissolve the political bands 
which have connected them with another.”53  These natural rights, as 
Hamilton stated, “are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or 
musty records.  They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume 
of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself.”54  Accordingly, these 
rights were considered by the Founders to have been planted in the human 
heart and soul by God himself.  As such they were unchangeable, and based 
on concepts of morality and godly behavior.  Any attempt to change, 
modify, or add to these moral standards was direct effrontery to God 
himself. 
The Founders well understood—and frequently expressed their 
concern—that if such morally-based rights were ignored, or attempts were 
made to alter or modify them, the very liberty of the people would be 
threatened.  As John Adams stated, “Our Constitution was made only for a 
moral and religious people.  It is wholly inadequate to the government of 
any other.”55  George Washington probably said it best when, in speaking of 
the new Constitution, he stated,  
                                                      
51. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 19 (“The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution 
is a basic statement of the inherent natural rights of the individual”); DANIEL A. FARBER, 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE ‘SILENT’ NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 8 (2007) (“[N]atural law was not a dead letter for 
the Founding Fathers; it was hard, enforceable law.”); Barnett, supra note 13, at 2 (“The purpose 
of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that all individual natural rights had the same stature and 
force after some of them were enumerated as they had before”). 
52. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 451. 
53. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
54. Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted (1775), in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 80 (John C. Hamilton, ed., 1850). 
55. Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of 
the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 46, at 
229. 
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I would not be understood my dear Marquis to speak of 
consequences which may be produced, in the revolution of 
ages, by corruption of morals, profligacy of manners, and 
listlessness for the preservation of the natural and 
unalienable rights of mankind . . . as these are 
contingencies against which no human prudence can 
effectually provide.56 
 
Again, these are points that are not very popular today.  It is more 
fashionable to try and change the Ninth Amendment to fit with the times, 
turning the Founders’ clear meaning into something more socially 
acceptable in a world where moral values have become secondary.  But it 
does not need to be that way, and that is not how the Founders intended it to 
be.  They desired that the morally based principles of their generation 
would continue to be followed by their descendents.  Nor did they think it 
would be hard to ascertain what these principles were.  As will be described 
in the following section, natural rights as understood by the Founders are in 
fact relatively easy to find and identify—their writings are full of them.  
Interestingly, the Supreme Court itself has occasionally made reference to 
them.  It is a pity they haven’t done so more often. 
PART TWO: EXAMPLES OF RIGHTS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
FOUND UNDER THE NINTH AMENDMENT, PURSUANT TO 
THE FOUNDERS’ VIEWS OF NATURAL LAW 
Some specific examples will demonstrate how Ninth Amendment 
natural law rights as understood by the Founders could have (and should 
have) been used to identify unenumerated rights that have been claimed 
since the founding.  Thirteen such examples will be discussed, based on 
rights identified by Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming & Sotirios A. 
Barber in their book American Constitutional Interpretation.57  Of course, 
this list is not exhaustive, and other sources may provide a slightly different 
list of rights.58  Yet the list provided by Murphy, Fleming, and Barber 
                                                      
56. Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (Feb. 7, 1788), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 318 (Jared Sparks, ed., 1835) 
57. WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING & SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1239–40 (2d ed. 1995). 
58. For example, Daniel A. Farber lists the following rights he feels have been found by 
the Supreme Court: (1) a right to sexual privacy; (2) a right of reproductive autonomy, or, in other 
words, to contraceptives and abortions; (3) a right for everyone to have a basic education; (4) a 
right to travel; (5) protection by government from private, domestic violence; (6) a right to refuse 
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generally incorporates most of the rights on all such lists.  This list provides 
as good a starting place as any to demonstrate how an understanding of the 
natural rights views of the Founders can successfully and safely answer any 
rights question that may arise, including those that we may think are too 
“modern” for the Founders to have ever contemplated. 
As noted above, the bedrock foundation for the Founders’ 
interpretation of natural law rights is a moral sense derived from the laws of 
God.  When this moral sense is applied to even modern conundrums that 
the Founders never had to face (of which there are surprisingly few), 
identification of rights is nevertheless as plain and easily discerned as ever.  
Nor is it necessary to dig endlessly to find the Founders’ views on rights.  
Their works are permeated to such a large extent with statements on nearly 
every subject that we need only familiarize ourselves with some of their 
basic writings to find what we are looking for. 
Accordingly, each of the thirteen claimed rights discussed below will 
include identification of natural law statements by the founding generation 
in support of or opposition to the claimed right.  Hence, it will be seen that 
the natural rights understanding of the Ninth Amendment by the founding 
generation could have resolved all questions about the existence of these 
claimed rights, without resort to any “penumbra” of rights derived vaguely 
from other amendments.59 
Regarding the nature of these rights, it should be noted at the outset 
that the rights discussed here—like the rights in the first eight 
amendments—include some which are purely natural rights, and others that 
are akin to natural rights, but which only arise in the context of the social 
compact, and would not necessarily exist in a pure state of nature.  Madison 
described this distinction by noting that in some cases his proposed 
amendments “specify those rights which are retained when particular 
powers are given up to be exercised by the legislature.  In other instances, 
they specify positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the 
compact.”60  Madison then gave a specific example of a positive right: the 
trial by jury, which he considered being as fundamental as a natural right.  
“Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting 
                                                      
unwanted medical treatment.  See Farber, supra note 51, at 14.  A number of rights are identified 
in 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law (2009). For example, section 589 says there is a right to 
privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs.   Section 606 discusses the right to run for 
public office.  Section 619 covers the right of personal appearance and grooming.  Section 608 
even reviews the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes. 
59. The reference to a “penumbra” in respect to the Amendments comes from a statement 
of Justice Douglas in Griswold, in which he said that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life.” 381 U.S. 
at 484 (1965). 
60. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 454. 
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from a social compact which regulates the action of the community, but is 
as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent 
laws of nature.”61 
Indeed, the first eight amendments themselves contained both purely 
natural rights and positive rights.  The same is true of the additional rights 
discussed below.  Both have their basis in natural rights, and both can be 
found by carefully reviewing the statements of the founding generation.62 
The thirteen rights presented by Fleming and Barber will now be 
discussed in turn. 
1 The right to retain American citizenship, despite even criminal 
activities, until explicitly and voluntarily renouncing it. 
The modern Supreme Court case cited by Murphy, Fleming, and 
Barber as finding this right was the 1967 case of Afroyim v. Rusk,63 in 
which the citizenship of a naturalized American was questioned after he 
voted in another country’s elections while living temporarily abroad.64  
There is no mention of the Ninth Amendment anywhere in that case.  While 
                                                      
61. Id. 
62. A categorization (in the view of this author) of whether rights are natural or positive in 
both the Bill of Rights and the additional examples of rights discussed in this paper is as follows: 
       From the first eight amendments (the amendment number given in parentheses): free exercise 
of religion (1) (natural); free speech (1) (natural); free press (1) (natural); freedom to assemble (1) 
(natural); right to petition government for a redress of grievances (1) (positive); right to bear arms 
(2) (natural); freedom from quartering of soldiers (3) (positive); freedom from search and seizure 
(4) (both natural and positive); warrants only allowed with probable cause (4) (positive); cannot 
be jailed without an indictment (5) (positive); against double jeopardy (5) (positive); cannot be 
forced to be a witness against self (5) (positive); due process (5) (positive); takings (5) (positive); 
speedy trial by impartial jury (6) (positive); accused is informed of accusations against him (6) 
(positive); right to witnesses and counsel in defense (6) (positive); trial by jury (7) (positive); 
against excessive bail or fines (8) (positive); against cruel and unusual punishment (8) (positive). 
       From the thirteen examples of rights taken from Murphy, Fleming and Barber (the right 
number given in parentheses): to maintain citizenship unless specifically renounced (1) (positive); 
equal protection from both state and federal government (2) (positive); right to vote (3) (positive); 
presumption of innocence (4) (positive); criminal proof beyond a reasonable doubt (4) (positive); 
use of federal courts and agencies to redress wrongs (5) (positive); right to associate (6) (natural); 
right to sexual privacy (7) (nonexistent for abortion; for contraception, natural); right to travel (8) 
(natural); right to marry (9) (natural); right to educate one’s children (10) (natural); right to choose 
and follow a profession (11) (natural); right to attend and report on criminal trials (12) (positive); 
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment (13) (natural). 
       Summary: 34 total rights on both lists, 12 of which are natural, 21 of which are positive, 1 of 
which is both (search and seizure) and part of one (sexual privacy—abortion) is neither.  Broken 
down separately: 20 total rights in the first eight amendments, 5 of which are natural, 14 of which 
are positive, and 1 of which is both.  14 total rights on the list of Murphy, Fleming, and Barber, 7 
of which are natural, 7 of which are positive, and part of one (sexual privacy—abortion) is neither. 
63. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
64. Murphy, et al., supra note 57. 
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the term “natural right” was rarely mentioned,65 the majority opinion 
commendably based much of its holding on the views of those in the 
founding era.  It cited congressional discussions about naturalization in 
1794, 1797, and 1818, and also quoted Justice John Marshall in support of 
this right, based on his views in the 1824 case of Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States.66  Justice Harlan in his dissent (joined by Clark, Stewart, and 
White) attempted to distinguish the Founding Era sources cited by the 
majority by asserting that most of the comments relied on by the majority 
were dicta.67 
A resort to the natural rights understanding of the Founders under the 
Ninth Amendment would have greatly aided the majority in supporting 
their opinion, and would have left the dissent with little to base their 
position upon.  Although the majority’s sources were good and their effort 
to ascertain the thinking of the Founders commendable, there were even 
better sources based on the natural rights beliefs of the Founders that could 
have and should have been used. 
The best expression is found in a plain statement by Jefferson in 1793: 
“[T]he laws do not admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of 
itself to a divestment of the character of citizen.”68  Jefferson noted that 
citizens are free to revoke their citizenship “by immigration, [and] other 
acts manifesting their intention, [and] may then become the subjects of 
another power.”69  Indeed, Jefferson noted that if mere commission of a 
crime could terminate citizenship, this would render the crime of treason 
“innocent by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the 
criminal to his country.”70 
                                                      
65. One of the references is particularly significant.  At issue was an “expatriation” law 
debated by Congress in 1868, which would have terminated citizenship not by voluntary 
renunciation, but by the happening of certain actions by a citizen.  Representative Nathaniel Banks 
of Maryland commented: “It is a subject which, in our opinion, ought not to be legislated upon . . . 
This comes within the scope and character of natural rights which no Government has the right to 
control and which no Government can confer . . . Congress shall have no power whatever to 
legislate upon these matters.  Id. at 266 n.20 (citing Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2316 
(1868))  It is heartening to see that, at least in 1868, a natural rights perspective still existed with 
some in Congress. 
66. Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).  Marshall 
stated that a naturalized citizen “becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a 
native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native.  The 
constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights.  The simple power of 
the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this 
power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual.” Id. 
67. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268–93 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
68. Letter to the United States Minister to France (Aug. 16, 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 381. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
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Another expression of the principle was given by James Wilson, who 
followed a lengthy discussion of natural rights and citizenship with this 
quote from Cicero—a quote that would have directly answered the question 
raised in Afroyim:  
 
[T]hat no one, contrary to his inclination, should be 
deprived of his right of citizenship; and that no one, 
contrary to his inclinations, should be obliged to continue 
in that relation.  The power of retaining and of renouncing 
our rights of citizenship, is the most stable foundation of 
our liberties.71 
 
Another good example is found in a discussion of citizenship and the 
state of nature in the very first Congress in May 1789.  An objection was 
raised as to whether William Smith, representative from South Carolina, 
had the right to retain his seat, since it was alleged that he had not been a 
citizen for seven years prior to his election as required by Article 1, section 
2, paragraph 2 of the Constitution.72  Smith explained that he was studying 
in Europe during the entirety of the Revolutionary War, and did not return 
to America until late in 1783, five and a half years before the election.  He 
affirmed that he had never sided with the British, even when living in 
England.73 
Two opposing points of view were expressed in the debate that 
followed.  One was by Madison, who asserted that the Revolution did not 
create a total governmental void and consequent resort by the entire 
populace to a state of nature.  Rather, what occurred was merely a 
renunciation of British rule by the established states or “societies” in 
America.  As such, the social compact of government in America continued 
unbroken, although under a different head (the states).  Accordingly, 
Smith—who was originally born in South Carolina—remained a citizen of 
that state and consequently of the United States during his time in Europe, 
and therefore the seven year requirement was satisfied.  Madison 
acknowledged that this line of reasoning also meant that all opponents of 
the Revolution could also be considered citizens.  Indeed, Madison noted 
                                                      
71. James Wilson, Of Man, as a Member of Society, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 245 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) (citing Cicero’s writings found at Pro.Balb. c. 13). 
72. This provision states: “No person shall be a Representative who shall not have 
attained to the age of twenty five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and 
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.” U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. 
73. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 413–18. 
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(similar to Jefferson above) that even an act of treason such as fighting 
against the United States—which is far more egregious than Afroyim’s 
casting a vote in a foreign election 178 years later—would not result in loss 
of citizenship.  Rather, it would subject traitors to potential punishment 
pursuant to laws regarding treason, but would do so on the basis that the 
offender was still a citizen of the United States.  In this regard, Madison 
said, “The number, I admit, is large who might be acknowledged citizens on 
my principles; but there will very few be found daring enough to face the 
laws of the country they have violated, and against which they have 
committed high treason.”74 
A very different view was espoused by James Jackson of Georgia.  He 
asserted that the people in America did find themselves in a total state of 
nature upon renouncing British rule, since he asserted that there was no 
continuity of government when the break with England occurred.  
Accordingly, in his view the Revolution constituted a complete break and 
resort to the laws of nature, and subsequent creation of a new social 
compact in new state and federal governments.  Therefore Smith’s being 
born in South Carolina would not help him since his birth occurred during 
the era of British rule, making Smith a British citizen.  Rather, he needed to 
have been in America for seven years prior to the election to satisfy the 
requirements of the Constitution.75 
Madison’s views prevailed.  By the overwhelming vote of 36 to 1, the 
members of the House concluded that Smith had been a continuous citizen 
for seven years and voted to seat him.  Jackson did not cast the sole 
dissenting vote; rather, he simply abstained from voting.76  A clearer 
demonstration of the Founders’ belief in the right of ongoing citizenship, 
such as was discussed in Afroyim, could hardly be found. 
Citizenship was debated again in the House of Representatives later 
that year when the first naturalization law was discussed.  During the 
debate, Representative Boudinot asserted that “after a person was admitted 
to the rights of citizenship, he ought to have them full and complete, and 
not be divested of any part.”77  However, Representative White interjected 
that perhaps “a clause ought to be added, depriving persons of the privileges 
of citizenship, who left the country and staid [sic] abroad for a given length 
of time.”78  Representative Lawrence immediately countered that this was 
going too far, since “[C]ongress had nothing more to do than point out the 
                                                      
74. Id. at 422. 
75. Id. at 423–24. 
76. Id. at 425.  Jonathan Grout of Massachusetts cast the only contrary vote.  Naturally, 
William Smith himself did not vote on the issue. 
77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 1147–53. 
78. Id. 
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mode by which foreigners might become citizens.” White later agreed with 
this point,79 which was repeated by John Marshall in the Osborn case, as 
noted by the majority in Afroyim.80  Madison also opposed the addition of 
such a clause, noting that the best way to verify the sincerity of those 
desiring citizenship would be a defined residency requirement before 
citizenship would be granted.  This would require a demonstration of 
loyalty that should discourage aliens who “might acquire the right of 
citizenship, and return to the country from which they came, and evade the 
laws intended to encourage the commerce and industry of the real citizens 
and inhabitants of America, enjoying at the same time all the advantages of 
citizens and aliens.”81  Again, this is the very thing that occurred in Afroyim, 
and the context of Madison’s statement again shows his understanding that 
citizenship in such a case would not be lost. 
In sum, the majority in Afroyim were correct that the Founders favored 
the citizenship rule they espoused in that opinion.  However, it would have 
been better if they had founded their opinion on the natural rights views of 
the Founders under the Ninth Amendment. 
2 The right to receive equal protection not only from the states but also 
from the federal government. 
Murphy, Fleming and Barber cite the entirety of chapters 14 and 15 in 
their book in support of this right, which chapters contain numerous cases.82  
By “equal protection,” the authors clearly mean the protection of minority 
groups from discrimination, which is provided under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The protected classifications usually identified today are race 
and ethnic origin, gender, age, and disability; however, any discrimination 
against a particular group of people could come under the equal protection 
right.  Obviously, this is a very broad “right” indeed. 
Of course, the most obvious example of violation of equal protection 
is racial discrimination.  The original Constitution seemed to sanction the 
most egregious form of discrimination by recognizing slavery.  Indeed, 
slavery was the one and only acknowledged deviation of the Founders in 
the Constitution from natural rights.  Before discussing slavery and the 
                                                      
79. Id. at 1149, 1152.  White stated, “[T]he power vested by the Constitution in Congress, 
respecting the subject now before the House, extend to nothing more than making a uniform rule 
of naturalization.  After a person has once become a citizen, the power of Congress ceases to 
operate upon him.”  Id. at 1152. 
80. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738; Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; see supra text accompanying 
note 66. 
81. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at  1150. 
82. Murphy, et al., supra note 57. 
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reason for this deviation however, it is essential to note that the Constitution 
itself contains an equal protection clause.  Equal protection is too 
fundamental a principle to have been left out of the original Constitution. 
The Equal Protection Clause in the Original Constitution 
Equal protection was provided by way of the ban on bills of attainder 
found in Article 1, Sections Nine and Ten.  A bill of attainder is a 
legislative act that targets an individual or group, taking from them their 
life, liberties, or property.83  Significantly, the Constitution gave the federal 
government the power to nullify such bills of attainder not only by the 
federal government itself (as seen in Article One, Section Nine), but also 
constitutionally banned all bills of attainder enacted by the individual states 
(as seen in Article One, Section Ten).  Hence, unlike the original Bill of 
Rights which only applied to federal acts,84 the Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause—the ban on bills of attainder—was intended from the 
beginning to apply directly to state acts. 
The ban on bills of attainder was the result of a compromise of the 
delegates in respect to James Madison’s proposal at the beginning of the 
Constitutional Convention respecting a “negative” on state laws, or 
legislative veto, under which the Federal Congress would have the power to 
nullify ANY state law.85  Madison viewed such a protection as absolutely 
essential, not only as a vehicle for the national government to keep the 
states under proper control, but also to protect the people from violations of 
their rights by the states.  Hence, it is error to assume that the Founders at 
the Constitutional Convention did not address rights until the end of the 
convention.  The legislative veto was understood by them as a rights 
protection.86 
However, many felt that the power to nullify all state laws was too 
                                                      
83. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (8th ed. 2004). 
84. This was confirmed in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
85. Journal of the Constitutional Convention, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 
supra note 1, at 19.  This was the sixth resolution of the Virginia Plan presented to the Convention 
by Edmund Randolph. 
86. Madison stated in a letter to Jefferson after the Convention that a “constitutional 
negative on the laws of the states seems equally necessary to secure individuals against 
encroachments on their rights.”  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), 
in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 27.  During the Convention, Madison 
noted on June 8, 1787 that one of the reasons for the legislative veto was because the states might 
“oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions.”  3 Id. at 121.  James Wilson 
concurred, noting that the legislative veto would serve both to keep the states in line and to protect 
individual liberties: “Abuses of the power over the individual person may happen as well as over 
the individual states.  Federal liberty is to the states what civil liberty is to private individuals.”  3 
Id. at 124. 
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broad, and might be too overwhelming a task for Congress.87  The delegates 
accordingly replaced Madison’s legislative veto with a judicial one.  They 
inserted a list in Article One, Section Ten, in respect to things that states 
could not do, leaving the federal courts to be called upon to protect those 
rights.88  A similar list restricting the federal government was inserted in 
Article One, Section Nine.  As stated by Gouverneor Morris at the 
Convention, “A law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the 
Judiciary departm[ent] and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a 
Nation[al] law.”89 
The broadest and most comprehensive of the protections in Article 
One, Section Ten was the ban on bills of attainder, protecting as it did all 
governmental actions designed to target groups for discriminatory 
treatment.  So sweeping were the protections in Article One, Section Ten—
and particularly the ban on bills of attainder—that Chief Justice John 
Marshall stated in 1810 that Article One, Section Ten “may be deemed a 
bill of rights for the people of each state.”90 
The Founders understood the ban on bills of attainder as a protection 
against discrimination against any group targeted by government, not just 
racial/ethnic groups.  One of the best expressions of this was from James 
Madison in 1794.  At that time, certain “self-created societies” were said to 
have been the motivating force behind the recent “whiskey rebellion.”91  It 
                                                      
87. Mr. Bedford of Delaware and Mr. Butler of South Carolina expressed this view.  The 
Journal of the Constitutional Convention (1787), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra 
note 1, at 126–27.  At a later date, Mr. Lansing also opposed the measure for the same reasons.  
Id. at 229. 
88. The list of rights to be protected was debated on Aug. 28, 1787, along with a 
discussion of the habeas corpus protection.  Journal of the Constitutional Convention (1787), in 4  
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 316–21.  When discussing whether 
impairment of contacts should be added to the list, Madison once again asserted “that a negative 
on the State laws could alone secure” such a protection.  “Evasions might and would be devised 
by the ingenuity of the legislatures.”  Id. at 319.  Madison repeated his dissatisfaction with the 
judicial veto as a replacement for the legislative veto on Sept. 12: “The jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court must be the source of redress.  So far only had provision been made by the plan 
against injurious acts of the States.  His own opinion was that this was sufficient.  A negative on 
the State laws alone could meet all the shapes these [rights violations by the states] could assume.  
But this had been overruled.”  Id. at 443–44. 
89. Journal of the Constitutional Convention, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 
supra note 1, at 440. 
90. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).  Justice Marshall stated as 
follows: “[T]he [C]onstitution of the United States contains what may be deemed a bill of rights 
for the people of each state.  No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts.  A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or 
may confiscate his property, or may do both.  In this form the power of the legislature over the 
lives and fortunes of individuals is expressly restrained.”  Id. 
91. This was a rebellion by radicals against a federal excise tax on whiskey.  Washington 
sent troops to put down the rebellion in Pennsylvania.  Many of the rebels were members of the 
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was well known that many of these societies were composed largely of 
members of the new “democratic-republicans,” the party of Jefferson and 
Madison.92  Even President Washington had condemned such societies in a 
State of the Union address.93  When Congress debated whether to issue its 
own statement against these societies Madison objected, stating in respect 
to such legislation that “if it falls on classes or individuals, it will be a 
severe punishment . . . Is not this proposition, if voted, a vote of 
attainder?”94 
During the Antebellum Period, the ban on bills of attainder continued 
to be understood as a unique protection of individuals against unequal 
treatment by state or federal governments.95  With the coming of the 
Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War however, this perception faded 
into disuse.  The ban on bills of attainder as an equal protection clause is all 
but forgotten today, since the Fourteenth Amendment has taken over this 
function. 
The Equal Protection Views of the Founders 
Even if we set aside the equal protection/discrimination safeguard in 
Article One, Sections Nine and Ten of the Constitution, equal protection 
against discrimination was also one of the principles of natural law that was 
firmly believed in by the Founders.  For example, the 1776 Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, penned by George Mason, declared that “all men are 
by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights.”96  
Similar statements can be found in the bills of rights of other states.97  In 
1785, James Madison stated that equality “ought to be the basis of every 
law,” after which he expounded on the meaning of the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights and its declaration of equality: “If ‘all men are by nature equally 
free and independent,’ all men are to be considered as entering into society 
                                                      
secret societies at issue.  For a discussion of the Whiskey rebellion, see FORREST MCDONALD, 
STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776–1876, 36–38 (Wilson Carey 
McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 2000). 
92. Id. at 37. 
93. Speech to Both Houses of Congress (Nov. 19, 1794), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 44–45, supra note 56. 
94. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 4, 1794), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 222 n.1. 
95. For a general discussion of bans on bills of attainder during the Antebellum Era, see 
Duane L. Ostler, The Forgotten Constitutional Spotlight: How Viewing the Ban on Bills of 
Attainder as a Takings Protection Clarifies Constitutional Principles, 42(2) UNIV. OF TOL. L. 
REV. 395 (2011). 
96. 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 44, at 3813. 
97. See Pennsylvania, 5 id. at 3082–83; Massachusetts, 3 id. at 1892; Vermont, 6 id. at 
3739; New Hampshire, 4 id. at 2454. 
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on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore  retaining no 
less, one than another, of their natural rights.”98 
James Wilson noted that “the law of nature, having its foundation in 
the constitution and state of man, has an essential fitness for all mankind, 
and binds them without distinction.”99  He also noted that “the original 
equality of mankind consists in an equality of their duties and rights.”100  
John Witherspoon stated that “men are originally and by nature equal, and 
consequently free.”101  An anonymous pamphlet author writing in 1783 
about the laws of nature noted that the “public good” does not justify the 
government from taking individual rights from any group—”the civil law 
should, with eyes of a mother, regard every individual as the whole 
community.”102  Many other sources could be cited, including of course the 
verbiage of the Declaration of Independence penned by Thomas Jefferson 
that “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal.”103 
Such statements may seem hypocritical or insincere in light of the 
constitutional protection of slavery.  But the Founders likewise recognized 
that slavery was directly contrary to the laws of nature.  For example, James 
Wilson stated that slavery “is repugnant to the principles of natural law, that 
such a state should subsist in any social system.”104  James Otis said, “The 
colonists are by the law of nature freeborn, as indeed all men are, white and 
black,” after which he then affirmed that slavery was “a shocking violation 
of the law of nature.”105 
Many slaveholding Founders also voiced their dissatisfaction with 
slavery, and expressed the hope that it could be abolished.  Thomas 
Jefferson noted that: 
 
                                                      
98. Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 2 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 186.  This reference was made against a proposed 
law that sought to establish a state-wide tax to support teachers of Christian religion.  Madison 
saw this as an attempt by the state to abridge fundamental rights regarding religious freedom. 
99. Of the Law of Nations (1791), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 71, at 
145. 
100. 2 Id., at 595. 
101. John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
JOHN WITHERSPOON 191 (Thomas Miller ed., 1990). 
102. Anonymous, Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced from the Laws of Nature 
(1783), reprinted in AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760–1785, 
567 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz, eds., 1983). 
103. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) 
104. Of the Natural Rights of Individuals (1791), in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 
supra note 70, at 605. 
105. THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 131 
(Samuel B. Rudolph ed., 1993). 
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The whole commerce between master and slave is a 
perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most 
unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading 
submissions on the other . . . [However] the spirit of the 
master is abating, that of the slave is rising from the dust, 
his condition mollifying, the way I hope preparing, under 
the auspices of heaven, for a total emancipation.106 
 
Indeed, Jefferson had introduced a proposal to the Continental 
Congress in 1784 to abolish slavery in new states that might enter the 
union.107  Washington noted regarding slavery that “there is not a man 
living who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the 
abolition of it.”108  And James Madison stated that he “thought it wrong to 
admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men.”109 
Why then was slavery allowed?  Simply in order to permit federation 
at all, as a distasteful compromise heartily disliked by many of the 
Founders.  In the course of the debates, southern states such as Georgia and 
North and South Carolina made it clear that they would not join the Union 
unless slavery was allowed by the Constitution.110  Distasteful and despised 
by many of the Founders as slavery was, they feared disunion more than 
maintaining the infernal practice.  Hence, it was reluctantly allowed, so that 
union could be achieved.  But this did not change the compromise on 
slavery from being what it really was—a blatant deviation from correct 
principles of natural law.  Several Founders expressed concern that God 
would seek vengeance on the nation for having allowed it to continue111—a 
prophecy fulfilled in the Civil War. 
The reluctant allowance of slavery highlights an important feature of 
                                                      
106. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 240, 242 (1801). 
107. See William G. Merkel, Jefferson’s Failed Anti-Slavery Proviso of 1784 and the 
Nascence of Free Soil Constitutionalism, 38(2) SETON HALL L. REV. 555 (2008) (describing 
Jefferson’s effort). 
108. Letter from George Washington to Robert Morris (Apr. 12, 1786), in 28 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 408 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938). 
109. Journal of the Constitutional Convention (1787), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 1, at 305–06. 
110. For a concise summary of much of the debate, see WILLIAM PETERS, A MORE 
PERFECT UNION 164–69 (1987). 
111. In speaking of slavery and how he expected God to someday address the issue, 
Jefferson said, “I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot 
sleep forever.”  Query XVIII (1801), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, 
at 267.  George Mason noted in the Constitutional Convention that slavery will “bring the 
judgment of heaven on a Country.  As nations cannot be rewarded or punished in the next world 
they must be in this . . .  providence punishes national sins by national calamities.”  Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention (1787), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 266–
67. 
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constitutional rights.  If the people, speaking en masse or through their 
representatives, collectively decide to defy the laws of nature by way of 
constitutional amendment, they may certainly do so.  In the minds of many 
Founders, such a position is taken at extreme risk, in light of what God may 
do to a nation thus defying His laws.  Hence, speaking of abortion or gay 
marriage as examples, a constitutional amendment legitimizing such things 
would be as valid as any other part of the Constitution.  However, when 
five men on the Supreme Court decide to create such rights, in defiance of 
the natural rights understanding of the Founders, which they are duty-bound 
to uphold, and without a supporting constitutional statement or amendment, 
a violation of the most egregious kind is committed against the 
Constitution.  This will be discussed more fully in respect to right number 
seven below. 
3 The right to vote, subject only to reasonable restrictions to prevent 
fraud, and to cast a ballot equal in weight to those of other citizens. 
Murphy, Fleming, and Barber cite the entirety of chapter 13 in their 
book in support of the right to vote, which chapter contains numerous 
voting cases. 
Once again, this right was well known to the Founders.  Indeed, as 
every student of the Revolution knows, it was largely due to the Colonists’ 
inability to vote on taxes enacted by Parliament that they revolted against 
Great Britain.  Alexander Hamilton, writing immediately before the 
Revolution, noted that it was the “unalienable birth-right” of every Colonist 
to vote, a clear reference to unalienable natural rights.  He then stated that: 
 
But, as many inconveniences would result from the 
exercise of this right, in person, it is appointed by the 
[British] constitution, that he shall delegate it to another.  
Hence he is to give his vote in the election of some person 
he chuses [sic] to confide in as his representative.  This 
right no power on earth can divest him of.  It was enjoyed 
by his ancestors time immemorial.112 
 
James Wilson expressed the concept succinctly by stating that “[t]he 
right of citizenship consists in these two things: 1. A right to elect. 2. A 
                                                      
112. Aexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 92 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob Cooke eds., 1961). 
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right to be elected.”113  The right of every man to “have the right of 
suffrage” was listed as a basic right in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of 
Rights.114  Similar provisions regarding the right of suffrage or to vote are 
found in the bills of rights or constitutions of many other states.115  And 
James Madison, writing in 1785 about the basic rights that should be 
included in the new Constitution and Declaration of Rights of Kentucky, 
inserted “the right of suffrage” as coequal with the habeas corpus, a free 
press, and free religious exercise.116  He again noted the importance of the 
right to vote in his 1785 “Memorial and Remonstrance”117 against a 
proposed Act of the Virginia legislature which would have implemented a 
tax to pay Christian ministers of religion.  Speaking in terms that 
demonstrate the right to vote as essential and sacred, Madison stated that if 
the legislature had the power to meddle with religion, they also could 
“controul [sic] the freedom of the press, may abolish the trial by jury, may 
swallow up the executive and judiciary powers of the state; nay that they 
may despoil us of our very right of suffrage.”118 
Some may question the use of the Ninth Amendment and the natural 
rights views of the Founders regarding the right to vote, on the presumption 
that the Founders were opposed to women’s right to vote.  Such opposition 
would not be well founded for two reasons.  First, many Founders did in 
fact favor women’s right to vote, or at least were not opposed to it if 
individual states provided for it.  Hence, New Jersey allowed women to 
vote between 1776 and 1807.119 
                                                      
113. A charge delivered to the grand jury in the circuit court of the United States for the 
district of Virginia, in May, 1791, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 71, at 796. 
114. 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 44, at 3813. 
115. See Pennsylvania, 5 id. at 3083; Massachusetts, 3 id. at 1891; Vermont, 6 id. at 3740; 
New Hampshire, 4 id. 2455; Maryland, 3 id. at 1687; New Jersey, 5 id. at 2595; New York, 5 id. 
at 2630. 
116. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 168.  Madison referred to the rights that should be listed as 
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may expressly restrain them from meddling with religion—from abolishing juries—from taking 
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118. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Nov. 11, 1785), in 2  THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 191. 
119. SUSAN E. KLEPP, REVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTIONS: WOMEN, FERTILITY AND 
FAMILY LIMITATION IN AMERICA 1760–1820, 7 (2009).  It also has been asserted that Lydia Taft 
was the first woman to vote in America, primarily because she was the recent widow of a wealthy 
landowner.  This vote was said to have occurred in Massachusetts, in 1756.  However, this 
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CHAPIN, ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE UNITARIAN CHURCH IN UXBRIDGE 172 (1864). 
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Second, and more fundamentally, the issue of the Founders’ natural 
rights views regarding women and the vote is rendered moot by the 
Nineteenth Amendment, which grants that right.  As noted above, Article V 
of the Constitution gives Americans the right to amend the Constitution at 
will, regardless of whether such amendments are contrary to natural rights 
or the intent of the Founders.  Once such an amendment is made, it is as 
much a part of the Constitution as the original text.  Accordingly, if the 
majority of Americans want a right of abortion or gay marriage, they can 
have one by constitutional amendment.  Again however, as described in this 
article, it is improper for the Supreme Court to create such a right on its 
own.  It is contrary to the Court’s authority to create new rights (especially 
controversial ones) which have no basis in the natural and positive rights as 
understood by the Founders.  Such policy matters should be left to the 
people, as expressed by their legislatures and the amendment process. 
4 The right to a presumption of innocence and to demand proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt before being convicted of crime. 
Several cases from the 1970s are cited by Murphy, Fleming, and 
Barber for this right.120  None of them make any reference to the Ninth 
Amendment or natural rights, but several of them do mention as the source 
of their authority the 1895 case of Coffin v. United States121  In that case, 
Justice White, writing for the majority, discoursed at length on historical 
sources of the rule that a person is innocent until proven guilty. 
While the maxim could therefore be found based on the assumption 
that the Founders were familiar with the law referred to by Justice White, 
there is more direct support of the natural law views of the Founders on this 
point.  One of the very best sources is found among the bills of rights of the 
states.  The Rhode Island Declaration of Rights of 1798, which expressed 
“the inherent and unquestionable rights of the people”122 specifically stated 
in section ten that “Every man being presumed to be innocent, until he is 
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pronounced guilty by the law.”123  Scholar Francois Quintard-Morenas 
provides a number of examples in both England and Colonial America 
between 1750 and 1800 where the maxim regarding the presumption of 
innocence is found.124  For example, in a charge to the jury in a case in 
Boston in 1765, the court noted that “Every Man in the Eye of the Law is 
presumed innocent till proved guilty.”125  A similar expression was given in 
a case in New York in 1800.126 
As for the right that proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt, once 
again this right can be found in an instruction to the jury, this time in the 
famous Boston Massacre case in 1770.  Both Justice Trowbridge and 
Justice Oliver in that case made references to the law of nature, after which 
Justice Oliver concluded by instructing the jury that “if upon the whole, ye 
are in any reasonable doubt of their guilt, ye must then, agreeable to the rule 
of law, declare them innocent.”127  A similar jury instruction was given in 
the 1800 slander case of United States v. Haswell128 and the 1814 homicide 
case of United States v. Travers,129 as well as the judgment of the court in 
the 1816 case of Spurr v. Pearson.130 
5 The right to use the federal courts and other governmental institutions 
and to urge others to use these processes to protect their interests. 
Two cases are cited for this right: The Slaughter-House Cases,131 and 
NAACP v. Button.132  The Ninth Amendment is not mentioned in either 
case, and there are scant and largely inconsequential mentions of natural 
law rights in the Slaughter House Cases, and not at all in NAACP v. 
Button.133 
This right also could have—and should have—been based on the 
                                                      
123. Id. 
124. Francois Quintard-Morenas, The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-
American Legal Traditions, 58 AMER. J. COMPAR. L. 107 (2010). 
125. Id. at 129 n.205 (citing JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND 
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS 
BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, 111–12 (1865)). 
126. Id. at 129–130 n.204, and accompanying text. 
127. John Adams, Wemms Trial, in 3 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 309 (L. K. 
Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). 
128. United States v. Haswell, 26 F. Cas. 218, 219 (1800). 
129. United States v. Travers, 28 F. Cas. 204, 213 (1814). 
130. Spurr v. Pearson, 22 F. Cas. 1011, 1015 (1816). 
131. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
132. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
133. In the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Field noted several pages into his opinion that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protected the “natural and inalienable rights which belong to all 
citizens.” 83 U.S. 36, 110.  The other reference to natural rights was in a footnote by Justice Field, 
referring to a 1776 French edict.  Id. at 136 n.39.  Button, 371 U.S. 415. 
68 FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7 
 
natural rights understanding of the Founders, since they intended for federal 
courts to be accessible by individuals in order to safeguard their rights.  One 
of the best expressions of this is found in the comments by Edmund 
Randolph in the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia.134  Randolph had been a 
member of the Constitutional Convention, and at the time of Chisholm was 
Attorney General of the United States.  However, in this case he undertook 
private representation of the Plaintiffs, who were the executors of an estate 
of a former resident of Georgia.  The executors sued the State of Georgia 
for payment of a bond that the state had promised to pay to the decedent. 
Randolph cited the prohibitions of state actions in Article I, Section 
Ten of the Constitution—including the ban on bills of attainder—then 
noted, “and thus is announced to the world the probability, but certainly the 
apprehension, that States may injure individuals in their property, their 
liberty, and their lives.”135  He later asked, “What is to be done, if in 
consequence of a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law, the estate of a 
citizen shall be confiscated, and deposited in the treasury of a State?”136  
The answer obviously was that individuals had a right to access the courts 
to secure their rights.  Indeed, Randolph stated that: 
 
It is not denied, that one State may be sued by another; and 
the reason would seem to be the same, why an individual, 
who is aggrieved, should sue the State aggrieving. A 
distinction between the cases is supportable only on a 
supposed comparative inferiority of the Plaintiff.  But, the 
framers of the Constitution could never have thought thus.  
They must have viewed human rights in their essence, not 
in their mere form.137 
 
It is well known that Chisholm v. Georgia caused such controversy 
among the states that a new Eleventh Amendment was created, which 
limited suits by individuals against states.  What is noteworthy about this 
amendment is that it was not intended as a blanket prohibition of suits by 
citizens against individual states, but only to disallow federal court 
jurisdiction of cases where a citizen of a state sued another state solely 
under state (not federal) law.138 
                                                      
134. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
135. Id. at 422. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 422–23. 
138. For a general discussion of this point, see Ostler, supra note 95, at 402–11. 
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Chisholm was a case in assumpsit to compel Georgia to fulfill the 
promised payment of a bond to the decedent.  As such, it was a case arising 
solely under Georgia state law, not federal law.  Georgia refused to appear 
in the case, considering itself to be immune from such a suit brought in 
federal court, as a sovereign entity.  But as Randolph noted, the plain 
wording of Article III, Section Two of the Constitution allowed suits in 
federal court even by citizens against other states solely under state law, 
even where there was no federal question involved.139  State governments 
were so incensed when the Chisholm Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff 
they immediately hammered out a new constitutional amendment.  In 1795, 
the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution, which forbade suit 
against a state “by citizens of another state, or by citizens of subjects or any 
foreign state.”  By its own plain wording, the Amendment was intended to 
modify only two of the nine bases for jurisdiction given in Article III, 
Section Two of the Constitution, and was not intended to alter or undermine 
subject matter jurisdiction under federal law (such as Article I, Section 
Ten).140  This was because the plain wording in Article III, Section Two 
allowed a citizen of another state to bring suit against a state regardless of 
the source (state or federal) of his claim.  Obviously therefore, this 
amendment was not intended to have any impact on a citizen bringing suit 
under a federal question.141 
Unfortunately, approximately 100 years later, this plain understanding 
of the Eleventh Amendment was lost in the 1890 case of Hans v. 
                                                      
139. Before the Eleventh Amendment, Article III, Section 2 gave an unjustified benefit to 
out-of-state claimants bringing suit under state law in federal court.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
140. This article states as follows, with numbers of the basis for jurisdiction added: “The 
judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, [1] arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; [2] 
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; [3] to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; [4] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party; [5] to Controversies between two or more States; [6] between a State and Citizens of 
another State; [7]  between Citizens of different States; [8] between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and [9] between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
141. It should be noted that the First Judiciary Act of 1789 did not allow even a federal 
question suit to be brought directly to federal court by an individual, as can be done today.  See 
First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 stat. 73, 85.  Rather, such a suit had to first be brought 
in state court, and then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court if one of the parties was unhappy with 
the outcome.  This procedure was created out of respect to the states.  Hence, the reason for 
Madison’s reference in such a suit to “an appeal against a State to the supreme judiciary” (see 
infra, text accompanying note 143).  As Justice Brennan explained in 1985, the First Judiciary Act 
“did not provide the federal courts with original federal-question jurisdiction, although it did in § 
25 provide the Supreme Court with considerable jurisdiction over appeals in federal-question 
cases from state courts.”  Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 280 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
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Louisiana.142  In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh 
Amendment meant that states could not be sued by individuals, regardless 
of whether the suing individual was a citizen of that state or of another 
state, and regardless of the nature of his claim.  In support of this surprising 
decision, the Hans Court cited a statement by James Madison that “[i]t is 
not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.”143  However, 
this was a statement out of context, as Madison also noted as part of the 
same quote that suits by individuals against states could occur “if a state 
should condescend to be a party” under federal question jurisdiction.144  All 
of the states had condescended to be parties to the Federal Constitution, and 
particularly to the subject-matter bases of jurisdiction in Article I, Section 
Ten, including the ban on bills of attainder (discussed above).  In addition, 
at approximately the same time that Madison made the statement relied on 
by the Hans Court, he also lamented the loss of the legislative veto in 
correspondence to Jefferson, and expressed his concern that an individual 
may find it difficult to finance a lawsuit against a state for violation of his 
rights.  He stated: 
 
It may be said that the judicial authority, under our new 
system will keep the States within their proper limits, and 
supply the place of a negative on their laws.  The answer is, 
that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law 
than to declare it void after it is passed; that this will 
particularly be the case, where the laws aggrieves 
individuals, who may be unable to support an appeal 
against a State to the supreme judiciary.145 
 
Hence, we see that Madison also contemplated access to federal courts 
of persons with claims against the government.  Indeed, his concern was not 
whether such claimants would be able to bring such suits, but whether they 
would be able to support—or in other words to afford—such a suit. 
Finally, the bills of rights of several states also contained a provision 
indicating that the people have a fundamental right of access to the courts 
for wrongs they experience.  Typical wording is from the Massachusetts 
Bill of Rights of 1780, which states, 
                                                      
142. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
143. Id. at 14 (quoting 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
533 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (1866)). 
144. Id. 
145. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 5 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 218–19. 
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Every subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain 
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or 
character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and 
without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and 
without any denial; promptly, and without delay; 
 conformably to the laws.146 
 
Similar provisions are found in other state bills of rights as well.147 
6 The right to associate with others. 
Two cases are cited for this right, De Jonge v. Oregon148 and NAACP 
v. Alabama.149  Neither case makes any reference to the Ninth Amendment, 
natural rights, or the laws of nature. 
Again, such a right was contemplated by the Founders, and 
commented about by them.  For example, among a list of natural rights 
given by John Witherspoon is “a right to associate, if he so incline, with any 
person or persons whom he can persuade.”150 
More fundamentally, the right to associate relates directly to the entire 
concept of the social compact, which was seen by the Founders as the 
reason men joined together to form government.  James Wilson articulates 
the concept well: 
 
This union may rationally be supposed to be formed in the 
following manner: if a number of people, who had hitherto 
lived independent of each other, wished to form a  civil 
society, it would be necessary to enter into an engagement 
to associate together in  one body, and to regulate, with one 
common consent, whatever regards their preservation, their 
security, their improvement, their happiness. In the social 
compact, each individual engages with the whole 
collectively, and the whole collectively engage with each 
individual.151 
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Additionally, the words of Representative Sedgwick from the debate 
on the First Amendment (described in detail above) pertain to the right to 
associate as well.  The point at issue was whether to include the right of the 
people to assemble.  Sedgwick indicated that such assembling was 
essentially the equivalent of associating with others.  For him, the right to 
engage in such associations was inherent in the exercise of free speech, 
since “if people freely converse together, they must assemble for that 
purpose; it is a self-evident, inalienable right which the people possess.”152 
7 The right to enjoy a zone of privacy. 
The only case cited by Murphy, Fleming, and Barber in support of this 
right is Griswold v. Connecticut, a case about contraception.153  The right 
“to make one’s own choice about having children” (which includes 
abortion) is joined by Murphy, Fleming, and Barber with the right to marry, 
as the Ninth right on their list.154  However, in a prior edition of their book 
they listed the right of choice about having children as a separate right.155  
Indeed, since the Supreme Court indicated in Roe v. Wade that the “right” 
of abortion is derived from the “right of privacy,”156 it will accordingly be 
discussed here.  Murphy, Fleming, and Barber list five cases in support of 
the right of choice regarding children, all of which relate to contraception or 
abortion, and all of which are based on the right to privacy.157 
The right of privacy as that term has come to be understood is not so 
much about privacy as about sex.  As such, it would probably be better 
worded as “rights related to sex and its consequences,” since it is invoked 
almost exclusively in respect to sexual matters such as contraception, 
abortion, and gay rights.  As we shall see, the Founders supported a right of 
contraception, but not of abortion rights or gay rights. 
While comments by the Founders on these topics are sparse, there is 
more than enough evidence to show how they felt about these matters, and 
                                                      
152. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 759. 
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what the natural law on these topics was.  Comments are sparse because it 
simply was not proper in that era to speak as openly about these issues as it 
is today.  As one scholar noted, “eighteenth-century social conventions . . . 
banned the reference to intimate topics, especially those involving 
sexuality.  The mention of pregnancy was considered off bounds.”158  
Hence, when Abigail Adams was pregnant in 1777, the private letters 
between her and John Adams (who was away at Congress) never mentioned 
more than her “condition.”159 
Abortion 
How the Founders felt about these matters becomes more clear by 
dealing with abortion first, followed by a discussion of contraception.  
While the Founders themselves rarely commented on these matters directly, 
the natural law writers they relied on most certainly did.  The Founders 
frequently identified which natural law writers they had studied and which 
they followed.  For example, in responding to British-supporter Samuel 
Seabury in 1775, Alexander Hamilton urged him to “[a]pply yourself, 
without delay, to the study of the law of nature.  I would recommend to 
your perusal, Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Burlemaqui.”160  
John Adams noted that James Otis, in 1775, when speaking of natural law 
would cite among others Pufendorf, Grotius, Barbeyrac, and Burlamaqui.161  
James Wilson in his lecture on “The Natural Rights of Individuals” cited 
these same classical writers, citing Burlemaqui more than any other.162 
So what do Burlemaqui, Grotius, and Pufendorf have to say about 
abortion?  Quite a bit.  Burlemaqui stated as follows: 
 
[T]he right which requires that nobody should injure or 
offend us, belongs as well to children, and even to infants 
that are still in their mother’s wombs, as to adult persons.  
This is the foundation of that equitable rule of the Roman 
law, which declares, [t]hat infants who are as yet in their 
mothers wombs, are considered as already brought into the 
world, whenever the question relates to anything that may 
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162. The Natural Rights of Individuals (1791), in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra 
note 71, at 592. 
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turn to their advantage.163 
 
Grotius was in agreement.  He noted that “children yet unborn are 
considered as already born, whenever their advantage is in question.”164  
The concept is simple: if there is a doubt or question about abortion, do that 
which errs on the side of protection.  Indeed, what could be more natural 
and to the “advantage” or “favor” of an unborn—at any stage of 
pregnancy—than to have its life preserved?  A similar point was made 
recently by a scholar who noted that the reference in the Constitution’s 
Preamble to “secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity  
. . .” creates an “honest doubt” as to whether “posterity” was intended to 
protect unborn fetuses—a doubt that should be resolved in favor of 
protecting the unborn.165 
Returning to the natural law writers, Pufendorf was quite specific and 
clear on the matter of protecting the unborn child, using similar language to 
that which has been asserted by anti-abortionists in modern times.  He 
stated: 
 
For the life of the babe was guarded not only by the mother 
instinct but by law; and the mother should have recognized 
before the event that her infamy was of less consequence 
than the death of one whose existence was due to an act to 
which she herself had consented.  Wherefore, if the care for 
her reputation meant more to her than the pleasure of 
copulation or the love of her own offspring, she ought to 
have been thinking about the matter before she took the 
man to herself.  After the act, the child does not merit 
death, in order that the sin of the parent may go 
unobserved.166 
 
Hence, Pufendorf was explicit in identifying protection of the unborn 
from the moment of conception.  He repeated this point with tremendous 
clarity on another occasion.  In talking of those who have no rights because 
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they are not yet “a part of the world,” he says “[n]ow by him who is not yet 
a part of the world we understand one who has not yet been conceived, not 
one who is still in the womb.”167  And on still another occasion, he stated,  
 
Obligation has also been enjoined upon parents by the law 
of nature, that not merely shall they not destroy by abortion 
the offspring conceived within their flesh, nor expose it, not 
put it to death after it has been brought into the light of day; 
but also that they shall supply it with nourishment (one or 
both of them, just as they have agreed in the marriage pact), 
until it can conveniently support itself.168 
 
Hence, natural law writers Burlamaqui, Grotius, and Pufendorf—who 
were heavily relied on by the Founders—were in agreement that abortion at 
any stage of pregnancy was contrary to the law of nature, and that the 
unborn should be protected from the moment of conception. 
A statement by John Adams praising the Greek political reformer 
Lycurgus likewise indicated his distaste for abortion.  Adams described 
how Lycurgus was about to succeed to the throne at the death of his brother 
Polydectes, “but being told his brother’s widow was with child, he declared 
himself protector only, and resigned the crown.”169  Then his brother’s 
widow offered to have an abortion to “remove out of his way the only 
competitor” to the throne.  Lycurgus then “deceived her by counterfeited 
tenderness; and diverted her from the thoughts of an abortion, by promising 
to take the disposition of the child upon himself when it should be born.”170  
Adams was clearly impressed by the magnanimity of Lycurgus, and his 
refusal to consent to the abortion. 
Adams was not alone among the Founders in speaking negatively 
about abortion.  Jefferson described abortion as one of the practices of some 
native American Indians of his day, who he characterized as uncivilized 
savages.  He then noted that “the same Indian women, when married to 
white traders, who feed them and their children plentifully and regularly, 
who exempt them from excessive drudgery, who keep them stationary and 
unexposed to accident, produce and raise as many children as the white 
women.”171  Other Founders did not refer to abortion per se, but used the 
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term in a negative sense to describe self-destructive actions.172 
Some may argue that the natural law position described above would 
be untenable with the Founders because the common law at that time stated 
that abortion was no crime prior to the “quickening” of the child—the time 
(approximately sixteen to eighteen weeks) at which the mother could feel 
the unborn child move in the womb.  Indeed, in an effort to support its 
position by a resort to history, the court in Roe v. Wade cited the common 
law for this very proposition.173  However, the Founders saw a clear 
distinction between the common law and natural law.  While none of the 
Founders had any problem with natural law, which they saw as divine, 
many of them disagreed quite strongly with many common law standards.  
For example, Madison described the common law as being full of 
“incongruities, barbarisms, and bloody maxims,” concluding that “the 
common law never was, nor by any fair construction ever can be, deemed a 
law for the American people.”174  Madison was particularly harsh against 
any assertion that the Supreme Court could interpret the common law as 
support for a constitutional right—exactly as happened in Roe v. Wade.  He 
stated: 
 
[W]hether the common law be admitted as of legal or of 
constitutional obligation, it would confer on the judicial 
department a discretion little short of a legislative power . . 
. [they would] decide what parts of the common law would, 
and what would not, be properly applicable to the 
circumstances of the United States.  A discretion of this 
sort has always been lamented as incongruous and 
dangerous . . . the power of the judges over the law would, 
in fact, erect them into legislators, and . . . it would be 
impossible for the citizens to conjecture, either what was or 
would be law.175 
 
Indeed, the contrast between the law of nature and the common law is 
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made even clearer when we consider how each relates to legislation and 
constitutions.  It is generally understood that the common law is considered 
binding as long as the legislature or the courts do not replace it.  As such, 
the common law is inferior to legislation and the courts, and can be changed 
at will by either.176  It is essentially the lowest level of law, and is the last 
resort where there is no other avenue of law to turn to.  Natural law on the 
other hand, as we have already seen above, was seen by the Founders as 
superior to legislation and to constitutions.  It is the highest level of law.  As 
James Wilson said, “Government, in my humble opinion, should be formed 
to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members; 
and every government, which has not this in view, as its principal object, is 
not a government of the legitimate kind.”177 
Hence, for the Founders if there was a conflict between a man-made 
law and the laws of nature, the latter should prevail.  Simply put, whatever 
the common law had to say about abortion is significantly subordinate to 
natural law.  To say that the common law should prevail in respect to 
abortion is to elevate the trivial over the essential. 
But this is not all.  When we closely examine the common law rule 
regarding abortion and the reason behind it, we readily see that the common 
law was actually also against abortion from the moment of conception in 
light of today’s medical technology.  To understand why this is so, we must 
examine the evidentiary nature of the common law rule. 
James Wilson observed in respect to the common law rule regarding 
abortions that 
 
human life, from its commencement to its close, is 
protected by the common law.  In the contemplation of law, 
life begins when the infant is first able to stir in the womb. 
(1 William Blackstone[] Commentaries 129).  By the law, 
life is protected not only from immediate destruction, but 
from every degree of actual violence, and, in some cases, 
from every degree of danger.178   
 
The italicized portion indicates the evidentiary nature of the common law 
rule—that in the contemplation of the common law (as given in 
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Blackstone’s Commentaries), proof sufficient for a criminal conviction due 
to abortion quite obviously required evidence that the child was alive.  In 
those days of limited medical technology, this was necessarily at the point 
of quickening.  Any act to abort the child from that time forward—which 
consequently stopped the movement of the unborn child—would be 
criminal.  Any abortive act prior to quickening would not necessarily “in 
the contemplation of law” result in a conviction, since it would be 
impossible to prove whether the child was alive when the prior abortive act 
occurred.  In short, due process and fairness required such a rule, 
particularly since stillborns were common in those days.179  An early 
English example of this concept is found in 1348 in The Abortionist’s Case, 
when it was decided that an indictment against a person for killing an 
unborn child was unacceptable because “it is difficult to know whether he 
killed the child or not.”180  A similar result was reached in Sim’s Case in 
1601.  One scholar notes that “[t]he judges for the case expressed concern 
about abortions and how difficult they are to prove.”181  Probably that is 
why most of the few abortion cases in early England resulted in acquittal, 
although there was one case in 1320 or 1321 in which “a person who 
caused an abortion was found guilty and hanged.”182 
Naturally, such an evidentiary problem would simply not exist today, 
with modern medical technology.  Remember that under the common law, 
the essential proof element is stirring, or movement of the fetus.  Just as a 
laser speed gun is used by police today to show evidence of speeding, the 
ultrasound and other modern medical techniques can be used from the 
earliest stages of pregnancy after conception to provide the evidence that an 
                                                      
179. Horan and Balch noted that “[t]he primitive nature of biological knowledge and 
abortion technology made it next to impossible to prove that the child was alive before the 
supposed abortion and that the abortion was the cause of death.”  Dennis J. Horan & Thomas J. 
Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Basis in Law, Logic, or History, in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A 
READER 94 (Louis P. Pojman & Francis J. Beckwith eds., 1994). 
180. Year Book Mich., 22 Edw. 3, in Fitzherbert, 2 LE GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, fol. 
217, no. 263.  The case is discussed and quoted in JOHN M. RIDDLE, EVE’S HERBS: A HISTORY OF 
CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN THE WEST 96 (1997). 
181. RIDDLE, supra note 180, at 130. 
182. Id. at 99.  Riddle notes however that the person hanged was also charged with other, 
unspecified crimes.  Riddle also referred to seven other cases that resulted in acquittal.  Id.  It is 
most likely this evidentiary difficulty of proof of causation that led Coke to articulate the “born 
alive” rule regarding abortion: “If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise 
killeth it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, and she is 
delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision and no murder; but if the childe be born alive 
and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder.”  3 COKE, INSTITUTES *50 (1648).  
Hence, aborting a quick child was criminal, but not murder, unless the child was born then died—
the surest proof of all.  Blackstone reiterated the rule from Coke with very similar wording.  1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129, *139. 
2013] Rights Under the Ninth Amendment 79 
unborn is moving—which was all the proof needed under the common law 
to show that the child was alive and merited protection. 
The words of Benjamin Rush offer further support for this view.  Rush 
was both a physician and a signer of the Declaration of Independence.  He 
pulled no punches on the commencement of life from the moment of 
conception when viewed from a non-evidentiary standpoint when he stated 
that life’s “first motion is produced by the stimulus of the male seed upon 
the female ovum. . . .  No sooner is the female ovum thus set in motion, and 
the foetus formed, than its capacity of life is supported . . .”183  Rush was 
aware that there was constant movement by the unborn from the moment of 
conception, regardless of when that movement could be established for 
evidentiary purposes.  He further noted that this constant state of motion of 
the foetus was supported in the first trimester by the heat it received from 
its mother and its own blood circulation (another form of movement or 
stirring verifiable with modern technology), and then later “[b]y its constant 
motion in the womb after the third month of pregnancy.  The absence of 
this motion for a few days is always a sign of the indisposition or death of a 
foetus.”184  Hence, Rush saw clearly that the life of the unborn commenced 
from conception, but could only be clearly proven after it started to move in 
the womb after the first trimester.  If an abortive act was taken after 
movement had been felt, causing the movement to stop, then proof was 
established for the crime. 
But this is not all.  The common law itself contemplated life and 
protection from the moment of conception in respect to inheritance.  That 
is, an unborn child had the right at common law to inherit from the moment 
of conception.185  In the law of inheritance, there was no evidentiary proof 
required other than being born alive.  Interestingly, the Roe Court partially 
acknowledged this startling ambiguity of the common law (but without 
noting that the protection was from the moment of conception)—and then 
promptly ignored it.186  There is tremendous inconsistency in protecting an 
unborn’s property more assiduously than his life.  Indeed, one jurist of 100 
years ago noted this inconsistency by observing that under the two rules, 
“one must respect the rights of ownership, and, so far as a civil remedy is 
concerned, disregard the safety of the owner.  In such argument there is not 
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true sense of proportion in the protection of rights.  The greater is 
denied.”187 
Again, the evidentiary rule of the common law in no way negated the 
reality that under the law of nature the unborn were entitled to protection 
from the moment of conception, regardless of whether the child’s mother or 
another person could be criminally convicted for an abortion in the first 
trimester.  Indeed, to assume that early abortions were “acceptable” in the 
Founding Era just because there was no evidentiary way to convict prior to 
quickening at sixteen weeks flies directly in the face of the moral-based 
aspect of the natural law believed in by the Founders.  It is to say that 
anything goes as long as you can get away with it, due to a lack of evidence 
to convict you.  That simply is not the way the Founders thought.  They 
treasured morality and virtue, and clearly saw natural law as the higher, 
God-given law that binds all men.  If a sense of morality was not retained 
by the people, government was largely meaningless.  As Madison firmly 
stated: “Is there no virtue among us?  If there be not, we are in a wretched 
situation.  No theoretical checks—no form of government can render us 
secure.  To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or 
happiness without any virtue in the people is a chimerical idea.”188  George 
Washington concurred, noting in his farewell address that “religion and 
morality are indispensible supports . . . [and the] great Pillars of human 
happiness.”189  John Adams expounded, in his usual blunt way, that “we 
have no government armed with power capable of contending with human 
passions unbridled by morality and religion.”190 
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade attempted to make its defiance of 
natural law more palatable by citing early Roman law in support of its 
holding, in addition to the common law.  The reason for this effort was 
obvious—if history supported its holding, it would be harder to criticize.  
However, the Court got its history wrong.  In respect to Roman law, it 
obviously overlooked (or purposely ignored) the Roman law cited by 
Burlamaqui that the unborn should be recognized as human beings when it 
is in their favor.191  As for the common law reference, as noted above, the 
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Court assumed away the evidentiary nature of the rule, instead stating that 
“The absence of a common-law crime for pre-quickening abortion appear to 
have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and 
civil and canon law concepts of when life begins.”192  The Court’s fixation 
on when life begins served to effectively mask the purely evidentiary nature 
of the common law rule, which focused on proof sufficient for conviction, 
not the moment of commencement of life.  The Court’s most blatant 
misstatement—directly refuted by the sources cited above—was its 
conclusion that “at the time of the adoption of our Constitution . . . abortion 
was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently 
in effect.”193  The Founders would never have agreed with such a statement. 
But the Roe Court didn’t stop there.  After discussing whether a 
“person” includes an unborn, the Court inexplicably abandoned the time of 
quickening or movement as the point at which the unborn can be fully 
protected.  The Court substituted instead the point of viability, when the 
child “has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”194  
Perhaps the Court was aware that modern medical technology could 
identify an infant’s quickening and movement much sooner than was 
possible in the eighteenth century, and therefore wanted to forever put to 
rest the evidentiary nature of the common law rule by creating a new 
standard.  If so, the court chose the least logical point of all—the point of 
viability.  The evidentiary proof of life as demonstrated by stirring or 
movement was now replaced with independence of life, or in other words 
that the child was now able to survive on its own.  By this standard, all 
unwanted children of any age who suddenly find themselves in need of life 
support should be denied it, and allowed to die.  Indeed, even a healthy 
baby is helpless and will die without help and support from the adults 
around it.  There simply is no basis for this new standard created by the 
Supreme Court, least of all in the natural rights protected by the Ninth 
Amendment. 
Contraception 
Like abortion, the Founders spoke very little about contraception.  But 
that does not mean they knew little or nothing about it.  Condoms made of 
animal parts had been known for centuries in Europe,195 and there is no 
question the knowledge of how to create such devices had migrated to the 
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Americas.  Other methods of contraception also existed.  For example, 
Congressman Sedgewick, who was referred to above in respect to 
congressional debates about rights, noted that his wife had breast-fed one of 
their children far longer than was necessary, apparently as a birth control 
method.196  Abigail Adams at various times expressed concern over the 
large number of children various relatives were having, thereby suggesting 
that these relatives should have followed some method of control to prevent 
it.197  Yet Abigail would hardly have been endorsing abortion as a method 
of birth control—she was nearly inconsolable at the stillborn birth of one of 
her daughters, and further noted that the death of the infant “was not owing 
to any injury which I had sustained, nor could any care of mine have 
prevented it.”198  Furthermore, abortion methods were so primitive in those 
days that there was a serious risk of death if the attempt was made.199 
Natural law writers were not silent about contraception either, 
although they had less to say about it than abortion.  For example, 
Pufendorf noted that “he who becomes parent of few children satisfies the 
law of nature as well as he who becomes the parent of many.”200  We have 
already seen Pufendorf’s comment above that favored abstinence in 
preference to trying to hide pregnancy through abortion.201  Pufendorf also 
stated that “to force a man to beget children to no hope but that of hunger is 
inhuman, and to fill a state with a crowd of beggars is improvident.”202 
One scholar researching views of contraception and abortion in the 
founding generation noted that in colonial America there were no laws 
against contraception at all, but there were laws against abortion.203  This 
speaks volumes in itself.  Susan Klepp’s research of fertility in the 
Founding Era indicates that birth rates dropped dramatically after 1750, and 
continued to drop throughout the entirety of the Founding Era.204  Her study 
describes the increasing control exercised by Revolutionary Era women 
over the size of their families, through use of the contraceptive methods 
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available to them.  Indeed, Klepp linked this new way of thinking by 
women of the era to the very principles of liberty and natural rights that 
motivated the revolution itself.205  As such, the revolutionary thinking and 
natural rights views of this era extended to more than mere political 
freedom.  This trend can be specifically seen in the family sizes of the 
Founders themselves.  Of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of 
Independence, more than half had six or fewer children—still large families 
by today’s standards—but significantly reduced from the typical families 
that had twice that many children during the prior 100 years.206 
There is tremendous consistency in the Founders’ view which 
supported contraception, but not abortion.  Family size and whether to 
create life in the first instance are matters of choice.  There is nothing 
unnatural in a couple taking reasonable steps to prevent conception.  But 
once life had its start, from the moment of conception it was sacred and 
worthy of protection, even if it was not comfortable or convenient to do so.  
At that point it was not a question of what a woman could do with her body; 
it was her responsibility to care for the body of someone else. 
8 The right to travel within the United States. 
Two cases are cited for this right by Fleming, Barber, and Murphy, 
namely Crandall v. Nevada,207 and Shapiro v. Thompson.208  Neither case 
mentioned the Ninth Amendment, and Shapiro contained only passing 
comments about natural rights.209  Once again, this right could easily have 
been found under the Ninth Amendment, pursuant to the natural rights 
understanding of the Founders. 
For example, James Wilson stated that “it is both inhuman and unjust 
to convert the state into a prison for its citizens, by preventing them from 
leaving it.”210  He further noted that “the right of emigration is a right, 
advantageous to the citizen, and generally useful even to the state.  It may, 
however, in the fundamental laws, be reduced to a certainty . . . By the 
constitution of Pennsylvania, it is declared ‘that emigration from the state 
shall not be prohibited.’”211 
Indeed, the 1776 Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution identified the right to travel as a natural right, stating in Article 
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fifteen “That all men have a natural inherent right to emigrate from one 
state to another that will receive them.”212  The 1777 Vermont Declaration 
of Rights had nearly identical wording.213  Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation stated that all persons “shall be entitled to all privileges and 
immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each 
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State.”214  
While the Federal Constitution of 1787 did not retain the reference to travel, 
it was undoubtedly understood as inherent in the privileges and immunities 
clause that was retained in Article IV, Section Two. 
But the right to travel has an even earlier and most auspicious history.  
Clause 42 of Magna Carta states that “It shall be lawful in future for any 
one . . . to leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land and 
water, except for a short period in time of war, on grounds of public 
policy—reserving always the allegiance due to us.”215  Clearly, the right to 
travel had been a recognized, natural right for centuries by the time of the 
drafting of the Constitution. 
9 The right to marry or not to marry and to make one’s own choice 
about having children. 
Five cases are cited for this right, none of which relate to the right to 
get married at all, but all of which relate to contraception or abortion, which 
was fully discussed above.216 
Not surprisingly, the Founders’ understanding of natural rights 
included the right to marry.  John Witherspoon noted that this natural right 
was part of the right to associate.217  James Wilson concurred, noting that 
“to the institution of marriage the true origin of society must be traced.”218  
He then decried sexual relations outside of marriage, noting that the 
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Romans began to consider that cohabitation without marriage was 
acceptable, which resulted in “that detestable train of conjugal vice, 
infidelity, rage, rancor and revenge, with which so many volumes of the 
Roman story are crowded and disgraced.”219 
An issue that would have appalled the Founders, but which has 
become a major point of discussion today, is so-called gay marriage.  At the 
time of the writing of this article, no Supreme Court ruling has been made 
in respect to such an alleged right of marriage, but one is expected soon.  As 
demonstrated by Wilson’s statement of disapproval of sexual relations 
outside marriage between a man and a woman, there is no question the 
Founders would have strongly opposed gay marriage. 
Indeed, in a surprising deviation from its normal practice of ignoring 
the views of the Founders, the Supreme Court ruled against gay behavior in 
the case of Bowers v. Hardwick.220In that case the majority opinion properly 
relied on history to support its ruling that upheld a Georgia state law against 
sodomy.  Justice White noted that sodomy was criminal in each of the 
original states in 1791.221  In his concurring opinion, Justice Burger said 
that Blackstone “described ‘the infamouscrime against nature’as an offense 
of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape, a heinous act ‘the very mention of which is 
a disgrace to human nature,’ and ‘a crime not fit to be named.’”222  Hence, 
in the days of the Founders, gay behavior was considered to be the ultimate 
crime against nature, and accordingly the ultimate defiance of natural law. 
Unfortunately, Bowers was expressly overruled by the Supreme Court 
seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas.223  The court in Lawrence did 
not mention the Ninth Amendment or natural rights.  As demonstrated by 
Blackstone’s and James Wilson’s statements above, there is no doubt the 
Founders would strongly oppose gay behavior and gay marriage as contrary 
to the laws of nature.  Accordingly, the decision about gay marriage is made 
easy by reference to the natural rights understanding of the Founders. 
10 The right to educate one’s children as long as one meets certain 
minimum standards set by the state. 
One case is cited in support of this right, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,224 
which overruled an Oregon law that required all minor students to attend 
public schools.  The Ninth Amendment is not mentioned in the case, nor 
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were natural rights discussed other than a passing reference by counsel for 
the Society of Sisters.225 
Once more, the natural rights view of the Founders supports this right.  
James Wilson stated that it was the parents’ duty “to educate them 
according to the suggestions of a judicious and zealous regard for their 
usefulness, their respectability and their happiness.”226  Speaking 
particularly of the father’s duty to discipline and educate, he stated that 
“Part of his authority he may delegate to the person intrusted [sic] with his 
child’s education: that person acts then in the place, and he ought to act 
with the disposition of a parent.”227 Hence, for Wilson, it was the parent, not 
the state, who had the duty of education—a duty he could never escape, but 
could delegate if he chose. 
In speaking of the right and duty of a father to educate his children, 
natural law writer Burlemaqui noted that it would not be “lawful for a father 
to neglect the education of his children, though the prince [government] 
should order him to neglect it.”228  Hence, even if government for some 
reason required a parent to NOT educate his children, he would still have a 
natural right and duty to do so.  Pufendorf stated, “Take away from the 
parents all care and concern for their children’s education, and you make a 
social life an impossible and unintelligible notion.”229  Once again, the 
parental responsibility for education was paramount in the view of natural 
rights writers. 
John Adams held firm beliefs about the need for parents to educate 
their children.  He wrote the following to Abigail in 1755: 
 
Education makes a greater difference between man and 
man than nature has made between man and brute . . . It 
should be your care, therefore, and mine to elevate the 
minds of our children and exalt their courage; to accelerate 
and animate their industry and activity . . . and an ambition 
to excel in every capacity, faculty and virtue.  If we suffer 
their minds to grovel and creep in infancy, they will grovel 
all their lives.230 
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Clearly then, the Founders viewed education of children as first and 
foremost a parental duty, rather than a duty of the state.  Indeed, Benjamin 
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson both sought throughout their lives to create 
opportunities for public education for those of the populace who desired it, 
since educational opportunities were very limited in those days.231  In 
modern times however, public schools have become so institutionalized that 
the idea of education as primarily a parental duty—rather than a duty of the 
schools—seems foreign.  Yet that was the educational concept of the 
Founders, based on natural law.  Public schools are at best an option parents 
can use to fulfill their personal responsibility to educate their children. 
11 The right to choose and follow a profession. 
Three cases are cited for this right by Murphy, Fleming, and Barber: 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana,232 Meyer v. Nebraska,233 and Gibson v. Berryhill.234  
None of these cases discussed the Ninth Amendment or specifically 
mentioned natural rights, although the court in Allgeyer did partially base 
its finding of this right on the “pursuit of happiness” clause in the 
Declaration of Independence.235 
Once again, the Founders’ understanding of natural rights included 
this right.  John Witherspoon lists as one of the fundamental rights of all 
men “a right to employ his faculties and industry for his own use.”236  James 
Wilson quoted Coke as stating that “no man can be prohibited from 
exercising his industry in any lawful occupation.”237 
The right to pursue a vocation was inextricably linked in the minds of 
the Founders to the right to acquire property.  Accordingly, Samuel Adams 
said, “In the state of nature, every man hath an equal right by honest means 
to acquire property, and to enjoy it; in general, to pursue his own happiness, 
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and none can consistently control or interrupt him in the pursuit.”238  In his 
great discourse on property, James Madison noted that men have property 
rights in a great many things not normally associated with property.  Hence, 
a man “has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice 
of the objects on which to employ them.”239  As the Allgeyer Court noted, 
these views by Adams and Madison are consistent with Jefferson’s famous 
statement in the Declaration of Independence that men have the inalienable 
right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”240 
Closely connected with the right to pursue a vocation is the right to 
contract, known in the Founders’ day as the right to the fulfillment of 
engagements.  This, too, was understood as a natural right by the Founders.  
James Wilson noted that a man has a natural right to “be free from injury 
and to receive the fulfillment of the engagements which were made to 
him.”241  Citing Barbeyrac, he also noted the “inviolable right of nature—
every man is obliged to a religious observance of his promise.”242  Jefferson 
concurred, noting that “I have but one system of ethics for men and for 
nations—to be grateful, to be faithful to all engagements and under all 
circumstances, to be open and generous.”243 
However, the right to contract was not left unenumerated; it was 
embodied in the Contract Clause, in Article I, Section Ten.  The Founders 
were greatly concerned with state laws during the Revolutionary Era that 
blithely eliminated contractual debts, in whole or in part, regardless of the 
debtor’s ability to pay.  This in turn seriously hurt the reputation of the new 
nation abroad.  As Madison stated, “It seems to be forgotten that the abuses 
committed within the individual states previous  to the present constitution, 
by interested or misguided majorities, were among the prominent cause of 
its adoption, and particularly led to the provision contained in it which 
prohibits paper emissions and the violations of contract . . .”244 
The Contract Clause follows immediately after the ban on bills of 
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attainder and the ban on ex post facto laws, since the sanctity of contracts, 
like equal protection (protected by the ban on bills of attainder), was too 
significant a right to be left out of the Constitution.  These bans are 
preceded by a prohibition against the states making anything but gold or 
silver a valid way to pay debts.  The states had frequently issued paper 
money, knowing of its tendency to become quickly devalued, as one way of 
assisting their citizens—even the wealthy ones—to avoid contractual debts.  
This is the source of Madison’s criticism in The Federalist Number Ten of 
the “rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts.”245 
Comments at the Constitutional Convention about the Contract Clause 
are very enlightening, and help us understand it better.  On August 28, 
1787, Rufus King moved for the addition of “a prohibition on the States to 
interfere in private contracts.”246  Madison agreed with the proposal, but felt 
that it was not the best cure since “[e]vasions might and would be devised 
by the ingenuity of the legislatures.”247  He therefore once again urged his 
legislative veto as the best method of protection.  Colonel Mason ignored 
the reference to the legislative veto, and simply objected that a ban on state 
interference with contracts “is carrying the restraint too far.  Cases will 
happen that cannot be foreseen, where some kind of [government] 
interference [with a contract] will be proper and essential.”248  Wilson’s 
prompt reply was that “retrospective interferences only are to be 
prohibited.”249  When it was pointed out that the ban on ex post facto laws 
which had already been adopted could accomplish the same goal, the 
Convention reaffirmed this ban (although rewording it as a prohibition on 
retrospective laws), then moved on. 
But the next day, Mr. Dickinson pointed out that he had reviewed 
Blackstone and the ban on ex post facto/retroactive laws applied in criminal 
cases only, and “would not consequently restrain the States from 
retrospective laws in civil cases, and that some further provision for this 
purpose would be requisite.”250  The record is devoid of any other comment 
on his observation, as the Convention moved on to other business.  But 
when the committee on style came back with a final version of the 
Constitution on September 12, 1787, Article 1, Section Ten contained both 
clauses.251  No further comment was made about the Contract Clause at that 
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time, but on September 14, Mr. Gerry proposed that a prohibition of federal 
interference with contracts be inserted similar to the one against the states.  
However, no one even bothered to second his motion.252 
The debates are enlightening because they highlight the way the 
natural law right of contract embodied in the Contract Clause was 
understood by the Founders.  It was to prevent retroactive alteration of 
some (but not all) existing contracts by the states, and not future contracts.  
The courts also had this view.  As one scholar noted, the early Supreme 
Court “conceived the federal contract clause to prohibit impairment of 
contractual obligations created before the enactment of the challenged 
statute, but to extend no protection to contracts formed thereafter.”253  Early 
cases demonstrate this.  One example was the 1810 case of Fletcher v. 
Peck,254 in which the Supreme Court invalidated an effort by the Georgia 
legislature to rescind the shady Yazoo land fraud enacted by a prior 
legislature.  Fraudulent as the prior legislation was, the Court upheld it and 
denied the new legislative attempt at rescission, precisely because the prior 
legislation had created contractual vested rights which could not be 
abridged.  Other cases of the era that confirmed this understanding were 
Calder v. Bull,255 and New Jersey v. Wilson.256  Indeed, in Calder Justice 
Chase shed some light on the rare circumstances in which contracts could 
be impaired by noting that this was justified only where it was “for the 
benefit of the whole community.”257 
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In modern times, the right to contract has arisen in a very different 
context—as the tool used by an allegedly activist Court in the early part of 
the 20th century to invalidate social legislation.  The so called Lochner Era, 
in which the right to contract was said to be sustained at the expense of the 
public welfare, is almost universally held up as an example of inappropriate 
judicial activism.  Interestingly however, the cases identified under the 
heading of Lochnerism—including Lochner v. New York itself—did not 
rely on the natural rights view of contracts of the Founders as embodied in 
the Contract Clause, but rather on a more activist, implied right to contract 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.258  Some scholars 
postulate that this switch was precisely because of the retrospective focus of 
the Contract Clause.  The Contract Clause with this limitation was not 
perceived as a sufficiently strong tool by conservatives to stop social 
legislation.259  Hence, the judicial activism of the Lochner Era was contrary 
to the understanding of the Founders about natural contract rights. 
Revisionist scholars such as David E. Bernstein and James W. Ely, Jr., 
have clarified that the alleged judicial activism of Lochnerism is mostly a 
modern creation, and activist cases were actually few in number.260  But 
whether the activist cases were few or many, the most important point to 
remember about the Lochner Era and the founder’s views of the natural 
right to contract is that the two are not connected.  As noted above, the 
Founders believed that retroactive interference with contracts in the civil 
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context should usually be avoided, but could still be justified in limited 
circumstances, for the benefit of the community.  For example, while they 
inserted the ban on state interference with contracts in Article I, Section 
Ten, to stop state efforts to help their wealthy citizens avoid creditors, they 
refused to extend the same limit to the federal government as Mr. Gerry had 
suggested.261  Indeed, Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution expressly 
gave the federal government the power to regulate bankruptcy laws across 
the country—a clear impairment of pre-existing creditor/debtor contracts by 
the federal government!262  In short, the Founders agreed that there were 
times that pre-existing contractual rights could be impaired, where to do so 
benefitted the whole community.  Their view of the right to contract did not 
support the Lochner judicial activism of the 1920s. 
In sum, the natural rights understanding of the Founders supported the 
right of individuals to pursue whatever legal vocation they might choose.  
The judicial activism of the Lochner Era was not in keeping with the views 
of the Founders about the natural right to contract. 
12 The right to attend and report on criminal trials. 
One case is offered in support of this right by Fleming, Barber and 
Murphy, the 1980 case of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.263  This case 
departs significantly from most Supreme Court cases discussed above, since 
the Court did a superb job of reciting historical evidence at the founding in 
support of this right.  For example, the Court quoted the words of 
Representative Sedgwick, cited above, about the right of the people to 
assemble together, thereby demonstrating the Constitution’s protection of 
this inalienable, natural right.264  The Court also quoted from an address 
directed to the inhabitants of Quebec by the Continental Congress in 1774 
describing the “irrevocable rights” and “the natural and civil rights” of the 
colonists as supporting this right.265  Additionally, the Court specifically 
acknowledged the Ninth Amendment as supportive of this right.266 
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In short, the Court in this case for the most part did what this Article 
urges—it based its finding of this unenumerated right on the intent of the 
Founders, and their view of natural rights under the Ninth Amendment.  
Indeed, this case demonstrates that such an approach is not that hard to 
undertake after all. 
13 The right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, including artificial 
nutrition and hydration, even if doing so may result in one’s death. 
One case is given in support of this right, the 1990 case of Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health.267  The Ninth Amendment and 
natural law are not mentioned in the case, although natural death without 
life support is discussed at length. 
Once again, statements by the Founders show that they would have 
agreed with this right.  The most far-reaching is a statement by Thomas 
Jefferson that would go beyond mere withdrawal of life support.  He 
commented that the herb Datura Stromonium which caused death “as 
quietly as sleep . . . seems far preferable to the Venesection of the Romans, 
the Hemlock of the Greeks, and the Opium of the Turks.”268 He then 
referred to “self-administration” of this drug in extreme cases: “There are 
ills in life as desperate as intolerable, to which it would be the rational 
relief, e.g., the inveterate cancer.”269 
Others of the founding era, while not going as far as Jefferson, would 
undoubtedly have agreed with a person’s right to not have life prolonged, 
but to allow a natural death.  For example, George Washington responded 
in 1798 (one year before he died) to concern and suggestions on how to 
sustain his health with these words: 
 
I thank you for the trouble you have taken in delivering 
your thoughts on the means of preserving health.  Having, 
through life, been blessed with a competent share of it, 
without using preventatives against sickness, and as little 
medicine as possible when sick; I can have no inducement 
now to change my practice.270 
 
Other Founders acted on such beliefs, rather than just commenting on 
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them.  For example, the biography of Rufus King records that in 1827, 
since King had lost most of his memory and strength, “he no longer wished 
to live.  He took to his bed in March and thereafter slept most of the time.  
Although not in pain, he lost his appetite and wasted away.  On April 29, at 
the age of seventy-two, Rufus King died.”271  Hence, King essentially 
withdrew his life support of food and exercise, allowing himself to die.  
Perhaps Jefferson did something similar.  He refused the laudanum he had 
been taking the night before his death on July 4, 1826.272 
Others expressed a wish that death come swiftly, rather than be 
lingering.  Benjamin Franklin took opium to relieve his discomfort as the 
end approached, and when his daughter expressed the hope that he might 
recover and live many more years, he simply replied, “I hope not.”273  John 
Adams in his old age wondered in a letter to Benjamin Rush if it wouldn’t 
be best for his horse to just stumble, resulting in a fatal fall one day.274  And 
James Otis, famed orator of the Revolution, frequently expressed the desire 
that when God “shall take me out of time into eternity that it will be by a 
flash of lightning.”275  In a fantastic display of thunderous power, that is 
exactly what happened—at age fifty-eight, Otis was killed by a lightning 
strike on May 23, 1783.276 
CONCLUSION 
It was the intent of the Founders that any unenumerated rights found 
to be constitutional would be derived from the Ninth Amendment.  These 
were rights that were based on the fundamental laws of nature, and were not 
considered as changing over time.  The Founders may have disagreed about 
the best governmental structure, but when it came to natural, inherent and 
ongoing rights, they were unified in their views.  Somehow, in the 200-plus 
years that have intervened, Americans have lost this simple, straightforward 
understanding of natural rights, and of the Ninth Amendment as the vehicle 
for such rights to be identified and preserved. 
The Founders intended for natural rights as they understood them to 
continue to hold sway in the United States.  Indeed, it was the natural rights 
view that was the foundation of the Revolution.  The views of the Founders 
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regarding natural rights that should be protected are easily ascertainable, 
and cover almost every contingency in which rights challenges arise—
including the so-called modern rights that the Founders supposedly knew 
little or nothing about. 
By returning to an acceptance and adoption of the natural rights views 
of the Founders under the Ninth Amendment, Americans can attain the 
stability in rights determinations that the Founders intended.  They can also 
avoid the trap of declaring as “rights” certain practices that are not 
supported by the natural rights views of the Founders. 
 
